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Disclaimers and Federalism
Adam J. Hirsch*
The beneficiary of an inheritance has the right to disclaim (i.e., decline)
it, within limits ordinarily set by state law. This Article examines situations
where a beneficiary's right to disclaim might instead be governed by federal
law, as a matter of both existing doctrineandpublic policy. Issues of federalism
arise with regard to disclaimers in several contexts: (1) when a disclaimer
would function to defeat a federal tax lien; (2) when a disclaimer could affect a
beneficiary's eligibility for Medicaid assistance; (3) when a beneficiary
disclaims ERISA pension benefits; and (4) when a beneficiary executes a
disclaimerprior to declaring bankruptcy or in the midst of a federal bankruptcy
proceeding. The Article begins by developing a theoretical model of the potential
costs and benefits of federal preemption, jumping off from prior scholarly
discussions of this problem. The Article then addresses,from the perspective of
the model, each of the four situationswhere a disclaimerraises federal concerns.
The Article concludes that different policy considerations arise in each
situation, depending upon how a disclaimer relates to federal affairs-viz.,
whether a disclaimer would threaten the financial interests of the federal
government, whether those financial interests can be safely delegated to states,
whether federal law regulates the kind ofproperty disclaimed,and whether the
disclaimer occurs in anticipation of, or within, a specialized federal
proceedings. Hence, the four situations addressed in this Article call for no
synchronized response from the perspective of federalism but instead demand
distinct treatment.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Most beneficiaries accept inheritances with open arms; other
ones prefer, for whatever reason, to reject them. 1 Under most
circumstances today, beneficiaries are free to accept or reject an
inheritance as they see fit. Nevertheless, if they wait too long to decide,
beneficiaries may forfeit their power to decline an inheritance. The
same is true if they bind themselves by contract to accept, or if they
initially accept and subsequently change their mind, or-perhaps-if
they are insolvent at the time when they inherit. These qualifications
on beneficiaries' freedom, and other elements of the law of
"disclaimers," as rejections of an inheritance are technically known,
traditionally come within the ambit of state law. Every state today has
a statute, overlaid upon an older body of common law, establishing the
applicable rules of disclaimer. These rules determine who, apart from
the beneficiary, can carry out a disclaimer on his or her behalf, how one
must be formalized, who receives the inheritance in lieu of the intended
beneficiary, what sorts of interests a beneficiary can disclaim, and
under what conditions a disclaimer is allowed or disallowed. 2 The
Internal Revenue Code includes a parallel set of rules as a matter of
federal law, but these rules govern only the effectiveness of disclaimers
for tax purposes, not their substantive validity. 3 If the applicable state
substantive law and federal tax law conflict, a disclaimer can take effect
in substance but remain a taxable transfer-or the reverse. 4
Federal courts must also sometimes assess the substantive
effectiveness of a disclaimer and not merely its taxability. In such
instances, federal lawmakers must decide whether to defer to state

1.

On the possible objectives of this sort of "postmortem estate planning," see MARY MOERS

WENIG, DISCLAIMERS A-4 to A-20 (Tax Management BNA, No. 848, 2000).

2.

The last two states to codify their laws of disclaimer were Mississippi and New

Hampshire in the 1990s. MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 89-21-1

(2014) (enacted in 1994); N.H. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 563-B: 1-B:2 (2014) (enacted in 1996). For an overview of the substantive law of disclaimers,
see RONALD A BRAND & WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE PLANNING 4-32 (1990).

3.
I.R.C. § 2518 (2012). A disclaimer deemed effective for tax purposes is called a "qualified"
disclaimer. Id.
4.
A disclaimer effective for tax purposes but not for substantive purposes under state law
is called a "transfer disclaimer," and it is provided for expressly under the tax code. Id. § 2518(c)(3).
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rules of disclaimer or to replace them with federal substantive rules.
Which route should lawmakers choose?
To assay this question, we must examine the characteristics of
disclaimer law from a perspective rarely associated with the minutiae
of inheritance doctrine-namely, the vantage of political theory.5 But
even then, no simple, consistent response may resonate. Different
disclaimers could raise different federal concerns. And each, in turn,
could call for different treatment within the theoretical framework of
federalism.
To be more exact: A disclaiming beneficiary (sometimes called a
"disclaimant") might have federal tax liabilities or seek means-tested
federal benefits, which a disclaimer would render (respectively) more
difficult or easy to satisfy. Such cases implicate a federal interest.
Alternatively, the disclaimer might affect only private interests, but
where the property the beneficiary seeks to disclaim takes a form
otherwise subject to federal regulation. Then again, the disclaimer
might affect private interests exclusively, concerning property
ordinarily regulated by state law, but where the disclaimer is
adjudicated within a specialized federal proceeding. The thesis of this
Article is that each of these federal concerns weighs differently upon
the problem and could prompt federal lawmakers to defer to their state
counterparts some of the time, but not all of the time.
The analysis that follows will unfold in stages. In Part II, I
survey the theory of federalism as a structural context for disclaimer
doctrine. In the next three Parts, I proceed seriatim to consider each of
the core circumstances under which a disclaimer might implicate
federal law and to explore how each fits into the framework of political
theory. I will address the state of the law in these areas, as well as its
wisdom in the light of theory. Finally, in the Conclusion, I review the
themes that emerge from this structural excursion.
II. PROLEGOMENON: WHY FEDERALISM?
Greek republics were sufficiently small that each required only
a single lawmaking authority and a single tribunal to make and
5.
Historically, political theory has helped to shape a number of other inheritance
doctrines-the abolition of primogeniture and fee tails, among other rules-following the American
Revolution. See Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1466-67 (2013); Stanley
N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 14-25 (1977). And again, late in the nineteenth century, the emerging doctrine
validating spendthrift trusts came under attack as "undemocratic," bound to give rise to a
'contemptible aristocracy," and hence as incompatible with "Americanism," see JOHN CHIPMAN
GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 246-47 (2d ed. 1895), although the doctrine

survived this political onslaught.
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implement rules for its citizens. The legal systems of these city-states
could be, and were, quite simple.6 Larger nations today need to
construct more complex legal systems, incorporating multiple
authorities and tribunals to service different segments of the
population. The structural alternatives open to founders in these
nations are without limit. In theory, founders could install a perfectly
communitarian system, each local community devising its own corpus
of law with its own court, coequal with all others. Or they could set in
place a perfectly regional system, under which each region has a
coequal representative assembly to make laws, with local courts
answering to a higher one within the region, but with no opportunity
for appeal beyond that region. 7 Or they could construct a perfectly
centralized system, with a single representative assembly and a single
hierarchy of courts, culminating in a supreme court, for the nation as a
whole.
Of course, our Framers preferred to introduce a system of
federalism that follows one of the myriad of alternatives in betweenconstructing dual assemblies (federal and state), coupled with a dual
hierarchy of courts, dividing up patches of the legal landscape in some
instances, and sharing power over the same patches in others. 8 Dual
structures of federalism also exist today in a number of other countries. 9
The virtues of such a system absorbed the Framers and have continued
to engage political theorists ever since.

A. FederalRules
Federal rules, formulated and applied uniformly throughout the
United States by Congress and federal courts, can afford citizens a
number of benefits. Legal actors may prove able to comply with federal
rules cheaply. To the extent actors must incur costs to learn rules and
engage in activities governed by those rules in different locations

6.

See ADRIAAN LANNI, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF CLASSICAL ATHENS 33, 39

(2006).
7.
Such a system operated briefly in the United States under the Articles of Confederation
between 1781 and 1787. The Confederation included no system of national courts and no supreme
court for the nation. Although the government did include a national Congress, which could resolve
disputes between states and had authority over maritime and other political affairs, Congress
under the Articles of Confederation made no internal laws for the states. EDMUND S. MORGAN,
THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89, at 106-07 (2d ed. 1977).

8.
For a classic structural discussion, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
9.
Canada is one example. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 5.1 (3d
ed. 1992).
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simultaneously, federal rules minimize law's information costs. 10 And
to the extent actors must incur costs to comply with law, federal rules
allow actors to standardize their behavior, another potential saving."
In two further ways, federal rules may reduce litigation costs. Federal
rules avert legal uncertainty stemming from conflicts of laws. 12 What is
more, a centralized legal system has the capacity to fill gaps in the law
more rapidly than a decentralized one, again mitigating uncertainty. 13
To see why, assume that an unresolved issue of law exists throughout
the nation. In a decentralized system, a statute or decision by the high
court in each state must fill the gap before the rule crystalizes
everywhere. But in a centralized system, the issue has only to come
before Congress or rise to the United States Supreme Court once.
Thereafter, lawmakers achieve certainty throughout the nation. And
the fewer steps this process requires, the less actors must spend on
litigation to clarify law.
In another dimension, federal statutory rules could prove better
designed than regional ones. Congress can draw on the resources at its
disposal to fashion rules on the basis of in-depth studies, undertaking
independent analyses that many state legislatures would skip in light
of the expense. 14 Put otherwise, when dealing with the costs of

10. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996) (exploring the virtues and vices of uniform acts, by
analogy).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The point is often asserted without analysis. See, e.g., In re Peregrine Entm't, Ltd., 116
B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("[F]ederal copyright laws ensure 'predictability and certainty of
copyright ownership' ....
) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749
(1989)).
14. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 10, at 140, 169, 171 (suggesting that a "parttime . . . legislature lacks the time and expertise to innovate"). Proposing statutes at the state
level, the Uniform Law Commissioners promote themselves as "highly qualified" drafters, see
Homer Kripke, Reflections ofaDrafter,43 OHio ST. L.J. 577, 584 (1982), offering model legislation
that "tends to be especially well drafted, on account of the Commission's resources and procedures,"
see John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 1069, 1080 (2007), hence offering an attractive alternative to federal law. See Ribstein &
Kobayashi, supra note 10, at 175 ("[S]ome advocates of uniform state laws view uniform laws as a
way of averting the great evil of federal law."). Still, neither the Uniform Law Commission nor the
American Law Institute has the means to fund empirical research for its drafting projects.
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly
Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309, 2337 (1996). Consequently, as one disaffected
Commissioner averred, drafters of uniform acts "will frequently be 'shooting in the dark.'" Richard
E. Speidel, Revising U.C.C. Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 609 (2001).
State bar association committees and model lawmaking committees alike are staffed by talented
attorneys and academics. Whether uniform acts manifestly "outperform" the products of local
drafting committees is open to doubt. For one example of uniform act failure, universally avoided
by local drafters of nonuniform legislation, see infra notes 317-30 and accompanying text.
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lawmaking, Congress can take advantage of economies of scale. Public
choice theory suggests that Congress could also prove less susceptible
to capture by special interest groups when formulating rules. The
teeming diversity of interests represented before a national forum will
tend to counteract each other in a manner not reproduced at the state
level, 15 although the point remains controversial among scholars. 16
Finally, Congress as a whole has no temptation to exploit negative
externalities, as state legislatures do. A state legislature might enact
rules that benefit citizens of the state at the cost of greater harm to
citizens of other states, which over time can spiral down into a
proverbial "race to the bottom."1 7 This phenomenon, incidentally, is not
confined to the United States; it can arise within any political
organization with a decentralized legal structure. Instances have been
observed within the Commonwealth of Australia, 18 as well as within the
community of nations, where individual nation states sometimes
compete to attract transnational business entities or expatriated
wealth.1 9
As for judge-made law, we have some reason to anticipate that
federal courts will produce common-law rules based on more impartial
policy judgments than rules generated by state courts. Considered
dynamically, case law should sustain equivalent evolutionary pressures
irrespective of its geographical reach. 20 Nevertheless, many state
15. Jim Rossi, The Electronic Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to
Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768,
1782 (2002) (book review) (observing the Madisonian roots of the argument); Adam Winkler, Free
Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 160-61 (2009) (same). The model laws offer no
assurances against capture. For discussions, see, for example, Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of
the Restatement and of the Common Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 595, 604 (2014); Kathleen Patchel,
Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993).
16. See Richard B. Stewart, Federalismand Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 921 (1985) (arguing
that the Congressional committee and subcommittee process restores a form of "micropolitics" at
the federal level, which the author dubs "Madison's Nightmare"). We might speculate further that
the incentives to capture "national" law will often exceed those of capturing individual
geographical regions, and that the duplication of costs of lobbying fifty state legislatures might
make singular investments in Congressional lobbying more cost-effective for special interest
groups.
17. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1494-95, 1499-1500 (1987) (book review). For the classic discussion coining the phrase, see
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
666 (1974), and see also Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2685, 2710-11 (2006) (suggesting the presence of political forces limiting the depth of the descent).
18. David G. Duff, The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from Canada,Australia,
and New Zealand, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 71, 117-18 (2005).
19. Hirsch, supra note 17, at 2710-11.
20. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.7 (8th ed. 2011)
(summarizing evolutionary theories of the common law). For criticism of some of those
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judges have local ties, potentially disposing them (like legislators) to
favor local interests over those of other states. 21 Moreover, in some
thirty-nine states today, judges are elected. Notwithstanding rules
against ex parte communication in individual cases, state judges (again
like legislators) may be vulnerable to capture by special interest groups
that contribute to judicial campaigns. 22
Finally, in still another dimension, federal rules help to build
national cohesion. Because rules not only reflect but also affect norms,
legal uniformity serves to homogenize culture and thereby inhibits
states from growing so disparate as to threaten the union. Our national
history demonstrates as well as any the potential of legal disuniformity
to polarize society and politics along regional lines.

B. State Rules
Decentralized lawmaking has its own virtues. States may
display characteristics sufficiently different from each other as to
benefit from different rules. Rules tailored for urban, industrial states,
for instance, might poorly serve rural, agrarian ones. 23 In addition, as
a counterpoint to the aim of national indivisibility stands appreciation
of local particularity: the populations of different states may adhere to
distinct values, which local rules can respect. Hence, citizens of a drugtolerant state, or of a munitions-tolerant state, might wish to license
activities that residents of their intolerant counterparts would prefer to
prohibit. And, however well fitted, economically or culturally, to the
evolutionary theories, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 68-87 (1991) (suggesting that the common law is susceptible
to interest-group politics without distinguishing the susceptibility of state and federal common
law), and Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425 passim (2005) (suggesting that behavioral law
and economics undermines evolutionary theories of the common law premised on classical law and
economics).
21. Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory ofFederal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
585, 627-30 (2006).
22.
JudicialElections: Torts and Courts, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2008, at 36; see also Keith R.
Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017,
1113 (2004) (suggesting that elected judges are "extremely susceptible to regulatory capture"); F.
Andrew Hanssen, LearningAbout JudicialIndependence: InstitutionalChange in the State Courts,
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 450 (2004) ("[A]n elected court, instead of being rendered independent of
incumbent politicians, simply became responsive to the same political forces that dominated
legislatures.").
23.
See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics ofFederalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal
Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 558-59 (1994) (again tracing the argument to the
Federalist-Anti-federalist debates); McConnell, supra note 17, at 1493-94 (same); see also Duff s
Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C. 315, 316-17 (Orphans' Ct. 1924) (offering a judicial defense of local
lawmaking); Hart, supra note 8, at 540 (identifying a system of purely national lawmaking as
"Procrustean"). See generally REGIONALISM IN AMERICA (Merrill Jensen ed., 1965).
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states in which they subsist, alternative rules in different states offer
citizens the opportunity (albeit at significant cost) to relocate to a
domicile whose laws suit their individual tastes and interests. When
such selective migration occurs, it raises the utility of the citizenry. 24
By the same token, state competition for citizens and businesses can
create incentives to enhance the desirability of rules that federal
lawmakers, exercising "monopoly" power over lawmaking, lack. 2 5
Perhaps most importantly, decentralized lawmaking facilitates
the development of rules by (so to say) trial and error. Lawmakers can
test alternative rules but confine their experiments to a single part of
the country, where any damage that a rule might cause will remain
limited. 26 Over time, such a process may not lead rules to diversify. A
successful innovation within one state can spread to the rest of the
nation, a phenomenon common enough in American legal history. 27

C. Our Federalism
Given these competing considerations, a scheme of federalism
could deliver the best of both worlds through a sort of division of labor
among lawmakers, sometimes referred to in the United States (a trifle
grandly) as "Our Federalism." 2 8 Where the Constitution permits or
provides, Congress or the federal judiciary can take charge of those

24. This idea traces to the economist Charles Tiebout. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). For a recent discussion, see Nestor M. Davidson
& Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63 (2013). We may
question, however, how commonly the allure of out-of-state law prompts population migration in
practice. Evidence of the phenomenon in the context of welfare migration is controversial. For a
recent study, see Terra McKinnish, Welfare-Induced Migration at State Borders: New Evidence
from Micro-Data, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 437 (2007).
25. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,
147-54 (1992) (arguing that the right of citizens and businesses to relocate from one state to
another creates incentives to optimize state law).
26. LeBoeuf, supra note 23, at 561-63; Ribstein & Kobayashi, supranote 10, at 140-41. For
a recent discussion advocating more legal experimentation and suggesting that states currently
have insufficient incentives to innovate, see Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 929, 946-48 (2011). Occasionally, federal lawmakers have also been able to conduct
limited experiments, at least in the tax realm, via pilot projects. Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash
Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37, 54-55 (2009).
27. Within inheritance law, for example, the British no-residue-upon-a-residue rule
(reallocating lapsed residuary bequests to the testator's heirs) once prevailed in every American
state. Breaking out on its own, Rhode Island replaced this doctrine with the remain-in-the-residue
rule (reallocating lapsed residuary bequests to surviving residuary legatees in proportional shares)
in 1896 and, little by little, this innovation has spread to all but seven states today. See IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.273A(2) (West 2013) (switching to the remain-in-the-residue rule, becoming the most
recent state to do so); Woodward v. Congdon, 83 A 433, 434-35 (R.I. 1912) (noting the statutory
history); In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 304 n.6 (Tenn. 2005) (tallying state law).
28. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
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rules better poured into a common mold. Simultaneously, those rules
better crafted pluralistically can disperse to state lawmakers for local
development. Under this system of federalism, our nation need notand does not-treat the problem of legal uniformity uniformly.
Still, structural choices remain. Rules in an area of the legal
landscape may become the exclusive domain of either federal or state
lawmakers-known as "field preemption" when ordained by Congress,
translating into "negative" or "dormant" lawmaking authority when
mandated by the Constitution. Alternatively, federal or state
lawmakers may compose the primary rule but then incorporate
subordinate rules from the other lawmaking body to fill in details.
Scholars who have remarked the practice dub it "interstitial
lawmaking." 29
One might assume that if a primary rule is more efficiently
treated centrally cel non, the same should hold true of subordinate
rules. Yet, on reflection, exceptions appear. Interstitial lawmaking
could prove efficient where the entity that provides subordinate rulesbe it a federal or state lawmaking authority-already has a head start
in developing them. In that event, lawmakers taking primary
responsibility for a rule can appropriate the work product of other
lawmakers, "draw[ing] on [a] ready-made body of ... law" 30 as a sort of
public good. Federal lawmakers can thereby clarify the law of an area
in which they wish to interpose a federal rule more quickly. 31 And state

29. William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1423-27 (2012); Hart, supra note 8, at 498.
30. De Sylvav. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956).
31. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporationof ForeignLaw, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 13336 (2008) (suggesting that a lawmaking authority might efficiently "free-ride on work done" by a
foreign lawmaking body, given that "[1]awmaking is often costly"); Martha A. Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 958-59 (1986) (observing that in
assessing the value of the uniformity provided by federal law, "it can be important that state law
in an area is highly developed and federal law is not"); Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of
"FederalLaw": Competence and Discretionin the Choice of National and State Rules ForDecision,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 832 (1957) (pointing out that in those fields where "local law ... is fairly
well developed, predictability would seem more easily realized" via interstitial lawmaking); see
also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) ("We think the
Congressional purpose can best be accomplished by application of settled state rules . . . ."). Only
when federal and state lawmakers begin to make law simultaneously would we expect federal
lawmakers to fill in the gaps of rules more expeditiously. See supra text accompanying note 13.
Notice that, beyond the realm of federalism, interstitial lawmaking bears a structural resemblance
to a common-law code, which likewise fills in its lacunae with preexisting case law, see, e.g., U.C.C.
§ 1-103(b) (2001), and which thereby offers the advantage of enhanced legal certainty in
comparison to civil-law codes, which preempt precode case law.
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lawmakers, too, can sometimes pull off the same trick in reverse,
incorporating settled bodies of federal precedents. 32
More fundamentally, the proposition that ideals of
(de)centralization will apply by extension from primary to subordinate
rules fails to consider that different policies may underlie related rules.
These differences could dictate distinct treatment under federalism. For
instance, subordinate rules of taxation may call for uniform treatment
even if a primary rule of substantive law does not, by virtue of the
independent tax policy in favor of horizontal equity. 33
Another way to mix centralized and decentralized lawmaking is
not to share responsibility, but rather to duplicate it. Both a federal and
state court could have overlapping authority to make law judicially.
Citizens can then pick and choose the rules that they prefer by bringing
their suit before one tribunal or the other, so long as each has
concurrent jurisdiction to try the case. In the United States, of course,
this sort of forum shopping (or, less pejoratively, "forum selection")
largely disappeared in the wake of Erie.34 Our Federalism no longer
countenances the practice. Residual forms of federal-versus-state forum
selection continue, though, in connection with specialized
adjudication-in the realm of bankruptcy, for instance, a matter to
which we shall return. 35
Of late, a number of scholars have called into question the
inequities and disharmonies traditionally associated with forum
selection. 36 At the same time, scholars have offered no affirmative
justifications for engaging in parallel lawmaking as an approach to
federalism. Do any such justifications exist?
On first glance, none is manifest. If federal lawmakers perceive
a reason for creating a centralized rule, then that fact in itself suggests

32.
The Uniform Probate Code's sections covering disclaimers afford an example. Under the
Uniform Probate Code, any "qualified disclaimer" under the federal tax code is deemed a valid
disclaimer under substantive law. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1114 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1
U.L.A. 409 (2013). The Reporter for these sections justified the doctrine, in effect, as an exercise
in interstitial lawmaking, noting that federal tax case law exploring whether a beneficiary had
carried out acts sufficient to constitute "acceptance" of an inheritance, and hence to preclude a
disclaimer for tax purposes, "is more highly developed than [the case law] of most of the States.
[This section of the uniform act] should reduce uncertainty in this area." William P. LaPiana,
Material for the ABA Meeting, at 20, July 6-12, 2000 (on file with author).
33.
See Field, supranote 31, at 970 ("[R]ecognizing a category in which federal and state law
can intermix allows for a sensitive balance of the factors involved, with the federal courts
interposing only as much federal law as federal interests require.").
34. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. See infra Part V.
36. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 360-63, 387-88 (2006);
Markus Petsche, What's Wrong with Forum Shopping? An Attempt to Identify and Assess the Real
Issues of a ControversialPractice, 45 INT'L LAW. 1005, 1010-15, 1017-19 (2011).
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the need to remove competing pluralistic rules. Perhaps in those areas
of law where state lawmakers are accustomed to holding sway, a
parallel federal rule could appear less intrusive than outright
displacement of state law. So long as federal lawmakers could open
their forum to all, or at least most, parties, and perhaps convince state
lawmakers to duplicate the federal rule, the outcome of the exercise
would be the same. 37 This move, though, would speak primarily to the
cosmetics of federalism.
At the same time, if federal lawmakers wish to make available
an alternative remedial apparatus, featuring a different set of legal
procedures, then an alternative body of substantive rules might be
singularly appropriate to that apparatus. 38 Such a dual regime would
not create a pure forum selection opportunity, in that litigants would
have to choose between alternative clusters of rules and procedures
associated with one apparatus or the other. As a legal process, "remedy
selection" (as we might call it) offers litigants the benefit of choosing
between different mechanisms of dispute resolution, which might prove
more effective or efficient in some circumstances than in others.
III. DISCLAIMERS AND FEDERAL INTERESTS
Having thus surveyed the theory of federalism, we proceed to
apply it to the law of disclaimers. A disclaimer becomes a matter of
federal law whenever Congress exercises its right of federal preemption.
One area where we might expect Congress to do so is in connection with
measures serving to bring in national revenue or programs paying out
national benefits based on citizens' means. In either instance,
disclaimers that leave citizens impecunious could damage the financial
interests of the federal government. These disclaimers appear
candidates for federal intervention, although the issue (as always)
requires analysis.

37.
Professor Field suggests that in deciding Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), establishing
overlapping authority between federal and state courts to make law prior to Erie, "[Justice] Story
apparently had believed that the Supreme Court would lead by persuasive force, . .. [and that] the
states would choose to follow the Court's precedents because of the quality of Supreme Court
reasoning and because of the Justices' prestige." Martha A. Field, Removal Reform: A Solution for
FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,Forum Shopping, and Duplicative State-FederalLitigation,88 IND.
L.J. 611, 647 (2013).
38. See Samuel L. Bray, The Chancellor Rides Again 48-52 (2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (arguing that the rules and procedures of equity, when "bundled" together,
form an effective "subsystem" of law).
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A. Tax Claims
Suppose an insolvent beneficiary who wishes to disclaim his or

her inheritance owes a tax debt or other obligation to federal authorities
that the government seeks to collect. Federal lawmakers can
reasonably claim control over disclaimer law in such a case. 39 Assuming
a state is home to both debtors and creditors, the decision to allow or
disallow an insolvent disclaimer will yield local winners and losers.
State legislators have no mercenary incentive to favor one over the
other. But when the creditor in question is the federal government,
those same legislators know that allowing an insolvent disclaimer may
benefit, but can only indirectly harm, state citizens. If local law
governed, states might be tempted to favor their citizens, exploiting a
negative externality-here imposing costs on the national treasury that
are dispersed throughout the country. State lawmakers could
accomplish that result by carving out exceptions for discrete categories
of creditors from a general rule governing insolvent disclaimers.
Federal lawmakers do not share this perverse incentive because,
viewed objectively, federal interests and the interests of citizens
throughout the country are coextensive.
Two qualifications are in order. First of all, the argument for a
federal rule of insolvent disclaimer applicable to federal creditors fails
to carry over to other elements of disclaimer law. Rules covering the
formalization and validation of a disclaimer, the devolution of
disclaimed property, and so on, create no opportunity to preserve assets
for the benefit of local citizens. Accordingly, federal lawmakers have no
need to reserve an exclusive power to make law over disclaimers in order
to thwart those ones that threaten federal interests. Here, federal
lawmakers can more efficiently create interstitial law, allowing most of
the corpus of state disclaimer law, accumulated over many decades, to
supplement a federal rule of insolvent disclaimer.
Second, the choice of rulemaking body remains distinct from the

choice of rule. Federal lawmakers have no cause to prefer federal
interests per se over all competing ones. 40 The issue demands an
objective judgment of public policy.
What, then, does policy analysis suggest a federal rule of
insolvent disclaimer should look like? To begin with, the law of
insolvent disclaimer need not be the same for all classes of creditors.

39. For prior related discussions, see Field, supra note 31, at 953-58 (addressing the problem
of federalism when the United States is a party to a dispute), and Tidmarsh & Murray, supranote
21, at 630-31 (same).
40. See Field, supra note 31, at 955-57 (advocating this principle).
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Just as so-called exception creditors can garnish a spendthrift trust,
whereas general creditors cannot,4 1 so could defined creditors, or even
defined federal creditors, have the right to prevent an insolvent
disclaimer, up to the value of their claims. 4 2 As of now, six states single
out classes of creditors for special treatment under the law of
disclaimers. 43 For federal law to establish a distinct rule of insolvent
disclaimer for the tax commissioner would extend the structural
principle established in those states.
The case for such variations hinges on the equities and
economics of different sorts of creditors' claims. Commercial lenders are
voluntary creditors. They extend credit to borrowers or offer purchasemoney credit fully aware of the risk of incidental default-but by
maintaining a portfolio of debt, voluntary creditors can spread risk. The
interest rates they charge reflect the risk of default, ensuring (within
an acceptable margin of error) that they will profit in the aggregate. 4 4
And in this connection, voluntary lenders seldom rely on debtors'
prospects of inheritance when they set the price of credit.4 5 In those rare
instances where expectancies contribute to creditors' assessments of a
debtor's creditworthiness, lenders can protect themselves by securing
an enforceable waiver of the debtor's right to disclaim. 4 6
By comparison, tort, alimony, and child support claimants are
involuntary creditors. Victims of negligence or circumstance, these
creditors cannot pick and choose their debtors and so have a stronger
moral claim to satisfaction. Economic considerations also argue in favor
of denying debtors the opportunity to thwart involuntary creditors'
claims by recourse to a disclaimer. A right to disclaim effective against
tort claimants would aggravate moral hazard-persons who are
judgment-proof have less incentive to eschew risk.4 7 And a right to
disclaim effective against alimony and child support claimants would

41. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE §503 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 524 (2006).
42. Such a rule would result in a partial disclaimer, which is allowed universally under state
law. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 390 (2013).
43.
See, e.g., TEx. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 122.107 (West 2014) (protecting exception creditors
in a non-uniform disclaimer statute); Adam J. Hirsch, The Code Breakers: How States Are
Modifying the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 325,
368 n.223 (2011) (identifying the five other state statutes that have modified uniform disclaimer
legislation to protect exception creditors).
44. Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 611 (1989)
(citing to studies).
45. Id. at 614 (citing to studies and judicial recognitions).
46. Waivers of the right to disclaim are enforceable in every state. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-1113(a), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 406.
47.
Hirsch, supra note 44, at 618-19.
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shift the costs of divorce or separation to parties who are less able (as
judged by the issuers of support orders) to bear those costs. 4 8
Within this framework, tax claims appear a sort of hybrid. On
the one hand, like a voluntary creditor, the Internal Revenue Service
has a large enough "portfolio" of taxpayers to allow it to spread risk.
The federal Joint Committee on Taxation takes the incidence of
expected tax delinquency into account when estimating revenues from
a given tax and its rate structure,4 9 allowing Congress to meet its
revenue goals regardless of delinquency. On the other hand, like an
involuntary creditor, the IRS does not agree to extend credit for unpaid
taxes to selected citizens. All share the same moral responsibility to
satisfy tax claims, and there seems no reason in policy to differentiate
inheritors from wage earners in this regard.SO
From another perspective, though, we can question any and all
creditors' rights to prevent an insolvent disclaimer: the disclaimer
fulfills the implicit intent of the benefactor, at least in those instances
where the amount of the inheritance does not dwarf the debt. 51 Few
benefactors would want their savings to go a beneficiary's creditors,
given that the beneficiary can seek a discharge of his or her debts in
bankruptcy, extinguishing them otherwise. 52 Those who plan their
estates properly take beneficiaries' liabilities into account. As a form of
postmortem estate planning, disclaimers preserve for poorly advised
benefactors opportunities that their better-advised counterparts
already enjoy, effectively correcting the will retroactively. 53 A number
of courts granting insolvent beneficiaries leave to disclaim have
48.

Id. at 619-20.

49.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ABOUT THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 10 (n.d.),

available at www.jet.gov/about-us/revenue-estimating.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7E7T3NRY (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
50. Certain private creditors exhibit this same hybrid quality and raise an equivalent
problem. By law, private hospitals must provide emergency care to all patients irrespective of their
ability to pay. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). Accordingly, hospitals often become involuntary
creditors. But hospitals can pass on at least part of the cost of default by charging higher fees to
their "portfolio" of patients.
51.
For academic discussions, see William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession
Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1077 (1966); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy:
The Meaning of the 'Fresh Start," 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 219-20, 235-38 (1994); and Hirsch, supra
note 44, at 632-38.
52. Some federal tax debts are nondischargeable and hence remain invulnerable to a
bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (rendering nondischargeable, inter alia, income tax
liabilities for returns due within three years of bankruptcy). Nevertheless, the IRS can compromise
nondischargeable tax debts where there is "doubt as to collectability," namely "where the
taxpayer's assets and income are less than the full amount of the liability." Treas. Reg. § 301.71221(a)(1), (b)(2) (2002).
53. For a further discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A
Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2004).
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justified the rule on this basis. 5 4 The same principle informs various
other modern rules whereby courts can modify estate plans ex post facto
on the basis of probable intent, for instance to accomplish the testator's
tax objectives. 55 A right of insolvent disclaimer fits neatly into this
paradigm.
Theory aside, the U.S. Supreme Court settled the issue with
respect to federal tax claims-or so it might appear5 6-in Drye v. United
States, decided in 1999.57 The opinion, announced by Justice Ginsburg
for a unanimous Court, leaves much to be desired. But it was, if nothing
else, a revealing exercise. 5 8
In Drye, Rohn Drye owed the federal government some $325,000
in unpaid taxes, rendering him insolvent. Under the Internal Revenue
Code, the existence of a tax liability creates a statutory tax lien in favor
of the United States that attaches to "all property and rights to
property" belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.5 9 Subsequently, Drye's
mother died intestate. As sole heir, Drye inherited her entire estate,
valued at $233,000. Drye proceeded to disclaim the entire inheritance,6 0
which next devolved to his daughter. Thereafter, she placed this sum in
an inalienable discretionary trust from which she, Rohn Drye, and his
54. See In re Scrivani's Estate, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1982) ("To hold [an insolvent
disclaimer invalid] . . . may frustrate the intent of the deceased, who sought to benefit the
distributee and not a private or public creditor."); In re Estate of Got, 408 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (Sur.
Ct. 1978) ("If the probable intent of the testatrix is to be considered at all, it is unlikely that she
would have insisted on paying off said debt over the legatee's protest."); Ohio Nat'l Bank of
Columbus v. Miller, 57 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943) ("The most cogent reason, in our
judgment, why the defendant should have the unqualified right to reject [a bequest] ... is that it
carries out the manifest intention of the testator."); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801 cmt.
(pre-1990 art. 2), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 619-20 (2013) ("This Section is designed to facilitate renunciation
in order to aid postmortem planning. . . . Renunciation may be made for a variety of reasons,
including carrying out the decedent's wishes not expressed in a properly executed will.").
55.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§

12.2 &

reporter's note (2003).
56. But see infra text accompanying notes 109-13.
528 U.S. 49 (1999).
57.
58. For prior academic discussions ofDrye, see William H. Baker, Drye and Craft: How Two
Wrongs Can Make a Property Right, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 745 passim (2003); Brian T. Camp,
Protecting Trust Assets from the Federal Tax Lien, 1 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 295,
303-07 (2009); Steve R. Johnson, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly in Post-Drye Tax Lien Analysis,
5 FLA. TAx REV. 415, 418-32 (2002).
59. I.R.C. § 6321 (2012). The government had perfected this statutory lien by filing. Drye,
528 U.S. at 52.
60. Although state law varies as to whether or not it allows insolvent beneficiaries to
disclaim an inheritance, the state in which the benefactor died in the instant case (Arkansas)
permitted insolvent disclaimers. Drye, 528 U.S. at 53. For a discussion of the doctrinal treatment
of this issue among the states, see Hirsch, supra note 44, at 592-601; for updates, see Adam J.
Hirsch, Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 109, 154-55 (2001) [hereinafter Hirsch, Revisions]; Hirsch, supra note 43, at 36768.
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spouse could all benefit. After learning of this chain of events, the
government sought to foreclose on its lien and sell the trust's assets. 61
In previous cases, circuit courts had divided on the question of whether
a disclaimer could defeat a federal tax lien. 62 The Supreme Court in
Drye resolved the conflict in favor of the government, holding that the
disclaimer failed to defeat the lien as a matter of federal law. 63
The Court based this holding on its construction of the provision
of the tax code authorizing statutory tax liens and delineating their
scope. The provision is notable for its brevity: it states that the lien
attaches to all of the taxpayer's "property and rights to property"64 but
without defining those terms or explaining where to look for their
meaning.6 5 The provision makes no mention whatsoever of
disclaimers. 66
In light of this fact, one can question the Court's core assumption
that the point at issue was one of construction. State courts have
evaluated creditors' rights to prevent a disclaimer from defeating an
execution lien upon an inheritance by developing the law of disclaimers
rather than by construing the law of liens. 67 Arguably, the Court in Drye
should have made federal common law for disclaimers on the basis of
implied preemption, rather than grope for substance in a tax-lien
statute that in truth contained none. In other instances, rules of federal
common law have filled in lacunae of the tax code. 68
Be that as it may, earlier opinions by the Supreme Court had
found that the tax-lien statute allowed state law to "determin[e] the
nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property." 69
The statute "create[d] no property rights but merely attache[d]
consequences . . . to rights created under state law."70 At the same time,
61.
62.
638 (S.D.
63.
64.

65.

Drye, 528 U.S. at 53-54.
See id. at 54-55 (citing to cases); see also United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632,
Ohio 1960) (holding that a disclaimer defeated a tax lien, but not cited by the Court).
Drye, 528 U.S. at 52.
I.R.C. § 6321.

See id.

66. See id. The tax code's general section validating disclaimers does not pertain to tax liens.
See id. § 2518; Drye, 528 U.S. at 57.
67.
See Lehr v. Switzer, 239 N.W. 564, 565-66 (Iowa 1931); Schoonover v. Osborne, 187 N.W.
20, 22-23 (Iowa 1922).

68.

Jasper L. Cummings, Nationwide Uniformity and the Common Law ofFederal Taxation,

66 TAx LAW. 1 (2012). Implied preemption arises "from an inference that Congress intended to
oust state law in order to achieve its objective," even in the absence of a direct conflict with a state
statute. Kinley Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 999 F.2d 354, 358 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941)).
69. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960) (quoting Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S.
78, 82 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Bess v. United States, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
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"federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest
or right by state law." 7 1 The state's label, be it "property" or something
else, was irrelevant. Furthermore, once the government identified a
taxpayer's interest in property, state law could no longer determine the
effectiveness of a tax lien to reach that interest, in priority to other
claims or rights. Here federal law took precedence by virtue of federal
supremacy.72
The Court in Drye reiterated these precepts. Opined the Court:
"The Internal Revenue Code's prescriptions are most sensibly read to
look to state law for delineation of the taxpayer's rights or interests, but
to leave to federal law the determination whether those rights or
interests constitute 'property' or 'rights to property' within the meaning
of [the tax lien provision]." 73 Thereafter, "state law is inoperative to
prevent the attachment of [federal] liens."74 In the instant case, Rohn
Drye's "unqualified right to receive the entire value of his mother's
estate .

.

. rendered the inheritance 'property' or a 'right to property'

against which the tax lien could attach, irrespective of the dictates of
state law.75
Left unexplored for the most part by the Court, both in Drye and
in previous opinions, was what made this interpretation "sensibl[e]." 76
As a matter of policy, why should the federal tax code defer to the
configuration of substantive rights of ownership created by the states,
even as the tax code reconfigures states' ordering of creditors' rights to
reach those same rights of ownership? The Court in Drye asserted both
principles as axiomatic. 7 7 In a prior case, the Court did speak to the
matter, albeit in the most general terms:
The application of state law in ascertaining the taxpayer's property rights and of federal
law in reconciling the claims of competing lienors is based both upon logic and sound legal
principles. This approach strikes a proper balance between the legitimate and traditional
interest which the State has in creating and defining the property interest of its citizens,
and the necessity for a uniform administration of the federal revenue statutes. 78

71. Morgan, 309 U.S. at 81.
72. Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57.
73. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999); see also id. at 58 ("We look initially to state
law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach,
then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as
property' or 'rights to property' . . . .").
74. Id. at 52 (quoting Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 61.
76. Id. at 52; see supra text accompanying note 73.
77. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 52.
78. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 514 (1960).
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The passage is inscrutable, as well as somewhat off target. Of
course, the states do have a "traditional"7 9 interest in structuring
property, but what makes that interest "legitimate"8 0 insofar as federal
claims are concerned? And why does enforcement of tax liens need to be
"uniform"?8 1 The real concern at this juncture should be state
discrimination against federal interests, 82 but perhaps the Justices
preferred to cloak that concern (insinuating the potential for local selfseeking) beneath the more diplomatic mantle of uniformity. A lower
court put the case more forthrightly: "If federal law [were] not
determinative of the [classification] of the state-created interest, states
could defeat the federal tax lien by declaring an interest not to be
property, even though the beneficial incidents of property belie its
classification." 83 By the same token, deference to state law concerning
the potency of a tax lien would place the federal government at the
mercy of local lawmakers, whose fidelity to the national interest cannot
be assumed.
With regard to the first question, as a matter of tax policy, we
can posit a justification for federal acquiescence in the configuration of
ownership interests at state law: doing so serves to avoid arbitrary
taxation.8 4 A federal right to reconfigure ownership interests
retroactively would allow the government to impose a tax lien-and
hence, in effect, a tax-on third parties who have only incidental ties to
the delinquent taxpayer.
Consider an example. Suppose a taxpayer opened a joint bank
account with a third party. Suppose further (as is typical8 5 ) that state
law granted to depositors a proprietary interest in the joint account
amounting to their varying, individual contributions to the account. If
federal law instead defined depositors' interests in a joint account as
divided equally between them for purposes of enforcement of a tax lien,
then the "innocent" depositor would be subject to tax liability, despite
having no economic connection to the liability (and possibly no
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.

82.
See supra text accompanying notes 17, 39.
83. In re Kimura, 969 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. On the primacy of this policy, see for example Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1916) (asserting in dicta that a tax could prove so arbitrary as to amount to "a confiscation
of property" that would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment). See generally DAN
THROOP SMITH, FEDERAL TAx REFORM 9-17 (1961) (addressing the "fairness" objective of tax
policy).
85.
See 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 13.10(a), at 445-46 (David A. Thompson ed., 1994)
(indicating that state law respects depositors' express and implied intent concerning how to
structure joint accounts).
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knowledge of it), apart from the happenstance of familial or social
association with the taxpayer. 86
Or consider another example, bringing us a step closer to the
issue raised in Drye. Suppose a testator named a taxpayer as a
beneficiary under a will. Under universal state law, bequests appearing
in a will are ambulatory-a testator can revoke them whenever he or
she pleases.8 7 Accordingly, bequests made by living testators
substantively comprise expectancies, not property interests, as a matter
of state law. But if federal law instead rendered a bequest under the
will of a living testator irrevocable once a tax lien attaches to property
of a beneficiary, thereby allowing the government to foreclose on a
bequest as if it were a vested future interest, then "innocent" testators
would again be subject to tax liability without having incurred it
themselves. And again, that liability would hinge on the mere
happenstance of association with the beneficiary, unrelated to his or her
tax delinquency.
Now, assuming that my elaboration of public policy is well
grounded and accurately reflects the Court's implicit understanding of
what lay at stake in Drye, how might the Court have assessed the
nature of a rule of disclaimer? Does this rule delineate an attribute of
property, appropriately left to state law, or does the rule stipulate
creditors' rights, appropriately superseded by federal law? The answer
is yes and yes-it is both. Any rule of disclaimer, creating a right to
decline gratuitous transfers of property, represents a structural
characteristic of property. Simultaneously, though, that characteristic
can function to thwart creditors' claims, no less effectively than an
express right of exemption from levy. In fact, this dual nature appears
responsible for the split of the circuit courts in the first place, with one
group of courts seizing on the first characteristic as dispositive, and the
other on the second.8 8
In light of this tension, the principled course-the course the
Court ought to have taken in Drye-is to step back. Whenever two (or
more) values compete to resolve an issue of law, we need to examine the
rationales underlying each, lest we choose between them
86. Cf. United Statesv. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720-33 (1985) (validating an
administrative levy upon an entire joint account in order to satisfy a tax lien, but only as a
provisional remedy, prior to determining the taxpayer's and third party's proprietary interest in
the account at state law).
87. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 222 (2013).
88. Compare, e.g., Leggett v. United States, 120 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Under Texas
law ... [the taxpayer] had the right to reject [the] intended gift by filing a valid disclaimer. . . ."),
with Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 152 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e hold that
the state law consequences of [the taxpayer's] right . . . created through [his] disclaimer under
[state law] is 'of no concern to the operation of the federal tax law.' " (emphasis added)).
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indiscriminately. One or the other may prove inapplicable to the issue
at hand, making resolution of the tension easy. At the very least,
comparative analysis should allow us to assess the relative strength of
competing values in an ordinal (if not cardinal) manner.
Here, on the one hand, incentives to favor local citizens could
move a state to manipulate rules of disclaimer in order to nullify tax
liens. Federalism can serve to abrogate state rules that exploit negative
externalities, as earlier discussed. 89 On the other hand, respect for state
delineations of property rights is unnecessary to avoid arbitrary
taxation in this instance. Once a bequest matures upon the testator's
death, the only relevant state-created right-the right to decline the
inheritance-lies exclusively with the taxpayer. If federal lawmakers
trample upon that right, interests of no "innocent" third parties are
compromised. Arguably, we might identify alternative beneficiaries
who would have taken an inheritance in lieu of a disclaimant as the
"innocent" victims of a federal rule forestalling an insolvent disclaimer.
In effect, the government is taxing their state-created interest in the
estate. Yet, this tax does not qualify as arbitrary. Alternative
beneficiaries have an interest in the inheritance subordinate to the
taxpayer's, and they do not forfeit their rights as a consequence of any
choices they made to involve themselves with the affairs of the
taxpayer. Indeed, as a practical matter, their interests only materialize
because of the taxpayer's liability: but for the taxpayer's predicament,
he or she would not be seeking to disclaim at all. Hence, the property
interest held by alternative beneficiaries proves a mirage. They lose
nothing that they would have had in the absence of the taxpayer's
delinquency.
And so, upon analysis, the tension stemming from the
ambiguous characteristics of a disclaimer resolves itself easily here,
without even the need for balancing. Whereas the concern to avoid state
discrimination against the federal government merits attention, the
concern to protect the interests of third parties from arbitrary taxation
fails to arise. Federal lawmakers can reasonably rework state-created
incidents of ownership in this instance because no one other than the
taxpayer suffers as a consequence. And, of course, his or her tax liability
is anything but arbitrary.
The Court in Drye arrived at this result. The Justices failed,
however, to arrive at it through analysis. Because the Court put
forward the principles it articulated superficially, neglecting to ferret
out the rationales underlying them, it had nothing at its disposal to
analyze. Of course, it remains possible that the Court thought through
89.

See supra text accompanying notes 17, 39.
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all of this in camera and preferred to leave its reasoning unspoken. If
that is so, then the Court did a disservice to later courts, which will
have no analytical foundation to build on when presented with tax liens
covering other sorts of ambiguous interests.9 0
What federal rule the Court should have imposed in Drye
remains a separate question. As earlier observed, the mere fact that
federal law governs does not imply eo ipso that the government should
triumph.9 1 Here, the Justices did posit a brief policy analysis, coupled
with a textual analysis. Neither aspect of the opinion is unproblematic.
As a textual matter, the Court emphasized the breadth of the
language of the tax lien statute: "Stronger language could hardly have
been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes." 92 At
the same time, in a separate section of the tax code, Congress did carve
out an exception for various specified (and value-limited) types of
property, designated as exempt from levy. 93 "The enumeration
contained in [this section] . .. is exclusive,"94 the Court observed, hence
"corroborati[ng]" 9 5 its conclusion that Congress intended to reach
property subject to a disclaimer. To be sure, this section of the Code
does expressly provide that "no property ... shall be exempt ... other
than" the items listed therein. 96 A disclaimer differs from an exemption,
however: a debtor gets to retain exempt property; a disclaimant does
not. The Court itself went on to distinguish the two concepts later in the
opinion.9 7 Although it does preclude judicial additions to the litany of
exempt property, this section does not foreclose judicial development of
a rule of disclaimer, either as a matter of federal common law or by
construing other sections of the tax code.
For his part, Rohn Drye had characterized the right to decline
an inheritance in his brief as an inalienable "personal right."98 In oral
argument, Drye's attorney laid out the case extravagantly, comparing
a beneficiary's right to disclaim with the "free will" of Adam and Eve to

90. Such cases will continue to arise. For one that already has, see United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274 (2002) (addressing whether a federal tax lien could attach to a tenancy by the entirety
created by state law).
91.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
92.
Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 56 (1999) (quoting Glass City Bank v. United States,
326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. I.R.C. § 6334(a) (2012).
94. Drye, 528 U.S. at 56.
95. Id.
96. I.R.C. § 6334(c).
97.
See Drye, 528 U.S. at 59 ("Just as'exempt status under state law does not bind the federal
collector' . . . so federal tax law 'is not struck blind by a disclaimer' ....
) (citations omitted).
98. Brief for the Petitioners, Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999) (No. 98-1101), 1999
WL 374573, at *13.
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reject the serpent's offer of a gift of forbidden fruit.9 9 The Justices found
the presentation amusing at first.100 But in a classic blunder of oral

advocacy, the attorney kept hammering away at this one metaphor over
and over, beating a dead horse, to the irritation of the Justices. 101 In its
opinion, the Court shot down the argument:
In pressing the analogy to a rejected gift, Drye overlooks this crucial distinction. A donee
who declines an inter iuos gift . . . leave[es] the donor to do with the gift what she will.
The disclaiming heir or devisee, in contrast . . . inevitably exercises dominion over the
property. He determines who will receive the property-himself if he does not disclaim, a
known other if he does. . . . This power to channel the estate's assets warrants the
conclusion that Drye held . .. a "right to property" subject to the Government's liens. 102

It was, the Court added, "a right of considerable value-the right either
to inherit or to channel the inheritance to a close family member (the
next lineal descendant). That right simply cannot be written off as a
mere 'personal right .. . to accept or reject [a] gift.' "103

Neither Drye's argument nor the Court's response moves us in a
helpful direction analytically. 104 Several alternative gradations of
"dominion" are conceivable. At the moment when a gift offer occurs, a
donee has the opportunity to capture the benefits of an inter vivos giftbut if he or she rejects it, the donee cannot know or decide whom the
donor might benefit next. By comparison, after consulting the will or
intestacy statute, a disclaiming beneficiary knows who the alternative
beneficiary would be, but the disclaimant does not make the choice. And
again by comparison, if a beneficiary assigns (rather than disclaims) an
inheritance, the beneficiary both knows and decides who the alternative
beneficiary is. The Court here ruled that knowing without deciding
represents a sufficient "control rein"10 5 for a tax lien to attach. But why

99. Transcript of Oral Argument, Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999) (No. 98-1101),
1999 WL 1050103, at *3. The attorney's first words set the tone: "For our Socratic dialogue I am
armed with a borrowed Gideon and the fruit. . . . [T]hese aids go right to the jugular of this case,
and the genesis of the case, which is chapter 3 of Genesis." Id.
100. Justice Kennedy quipped, eliciting laughter, "Well, of course, the IRS was not in
Paradise." Id.
101. Chief Justice Rehnquist eventually snapped at the attorney: "[D]on't tell me about the
bite of the apple anymore." Id. at *12.
102. Drye, 528 U.S. at 60-61 (citation omitted).
103. Id. at 60 (quoting Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 98, at *13).
104. At this juncture of the opinion, the Court cited to an early article of mine, Hirsch, supra
note 44, at 607-08. Drye, 528 U.S. at 61. Nevertheless, as I had argued in that article-in the pages
directly following the ones cited by the Court-"dominion theory," as I called it, in and of itself, is
unenlightening as a tool of policy analysis. Hirsch, supra note 44, at 609-10.
105. Drye, 528 U.S. at 61.
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draw the line there-why, for example, does not any opportunity to
capture benefits, including an offer of a gift, suffice?10o
One could, indeed, make a case that the Court's determination
that knowing without deciding constitutes the "crucial"10 7 element of
dominion proves too much. On this standard, all disclaimers would
comprise taxable transfers since all share this same structural
attribute. But, of course, that is not and has never been the rule. Under
our law, disclaimers (unlike assignments of an inheritance) do not
qualify as taxable events. 108 Why, then, does the disclaimant's degree
of dominion applicable to the collection of back taxes differ from the
degree of dominion applicable to the assessment of front taxes? The
Court failed both to explicate how the public policies pertaining to the
two standards are distinguishable and to articulate any substantive
reason why the point along the spectrum of alternative degrees of
dominion where the Court drew its line should qualify as the decisive
one.
And that is not all. By further lighting on the "considerable
109
value"
of Drye's right as significant, the Court raised implicit
questions, nowhere explored in the opinion, about the scope of its
judgment. 110 For the Court failed to remark that the opportunity to
"channel the inheritance to a close family member (the next lineal
descendent),"11 1 although present in Drye, depends upon the facts of
each case. Wills can provide expressly for the contingency of disclaimer,
and they might name alternative takers who have no blood relationship
to the primary beneficiary.112 Even in the event of intestacy, a
disclaimed inheritance could go to a collateral relative in the absence of
a surviving lineal descendant. 113 Does the attachment of a tax lien
depend on the existence of a family relationship between the
disclaimant and the alternative beneficiary, as Drye could be read to

106. Although it did not rule explicitly that a tax lien fails to cover an offered gift that the
taxpayer declined, the Court implied so by remarking the "crucial distinction" between the degree
of dominion exercised by a declining donee and a disclaiming beneficiary. Id. at 60. In oral
argument, the Justice Department attorney also drew the distinction, asserting that "an offeree
doesn't have any legal rights in the proposed gift. He can't enforce the offer." Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 99, at *17. But an offeree can accept the offer. In theory, a tax lien could
attach eo instanti at the time when a gift offer occurs.
107. Drye, 528 U.S. at 60.
108. I.R.C. § 2518 (2012).
109. Drye, 528 U.S. at 60.
110. Academic discussions have missed the potential doctrinal significance of this aspect of
the opinion in Drye. See supra note 58.
111. Drye, 528 U.S. at 60.
112. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1106(b)(2) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 393 (2013).
113. E.g., id. § 2-103, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 104.
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imply? And if so, how close does that relationship have to be? For the
Court unwittingly to leave such a fundamental matter of law unsettled
is-well-unsettling.
It happens that the facts of Drye illustrated in an unusually
poignant way another public policy, noted earlier,1 14 that might have
figured in the Court's analysis, had it been prepared to establish a
federal common law of disclaimer. Toward the end of the oral argument,
Justice Ginsburg commented to Drye's attorney: "I'm just curious about
why the taxpayer,

...

being in this situation,

. ..

didn't have his mother

write a will leaving the estate to the daughter."1 15 Here, Ginsburg
adverted to the issue of testamentary intent, which pertains to any and
all disclaimers, including those confounding federal creditors. The
attorney responded:
We had an appointment with her on the day of her death to execute a will.. .. I mean,
that was what was to happen, and it's just one of those things in life that, in fact, Mr.
Drye did not want to go talk to his mamma and tell her- . . [she] was almost 92, 1 believe,
at that time. He didn't want to go tell his mother, sign this piece of paper so that we don't
have to be up here today. 116

The Court made no direct response, and the debate meandered on. 117
Yet, plainly enough, Drye's mother is spinning in her grave at the
outcome of this case. What is more, she came within a hair's breadth of
effectuating the outcome she would have preferred. 118 This argument
might have proven the most potent one in Drye's arsenal, and he should
have led with it.119
But the government, too, left an unspent arrow in its quiver. For,
even if state law applied, the daughter's subsequent disposition of the
disclaimed inheritance, placing it in a trust from which the taxpayer
could continue to benefit, was too clever by half. Under state common
law supplementing local statutes, collusive disclaimers are invalid. 120
The Court in Drye concluded that Rohn Drye had the "undoubted
114. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
115. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 99, at *14.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See id.
118. Such a "near miss" of legality adds pathos to a case and can influence courts. Adam J.
Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 ILL. L. REV. 557, 587-89. On the psychology
of near misses, see id. at 561-70.
119. Neither the argument, nor a statement of the pertinent facts, appeared in the taxpayer's
brief. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 98.
120. See Hirsch, supra note 44, at 594 (reviewing the case law). For a recognition of the
potential application of this doctrine in a case deciding the validity of a disclaimer in a federal
bankruptcy proceeding, addressed infra Part V, see Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 610
F.2d 512, 520 n.22 (8th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the doctrine in connection with determining
whether a disclaimer is qualified for tax purposes, see Estate of Monroe v. Comm'r, 124 F.3d 699,
708-14 (5th Cir. 1997).
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right . . . to disclaim the inheritance" under state law, 12 1 which would
ordinarily have been true, but not if the disclaimer was found to be
collusive. In that event, the Court could have held the troublesome issue
of federalism moot. But the government failed to press the point, 12 2 even
though the Eighth Circuit had hinted at the issue in its holding below.
Observed the judges, "[W]e would be remiss in setting forth our
analysis, if we failed to note that [the taxpayer's] retention of a life
estate in the Trust,

. .

. [containing] the disclaimed property, gives us

considerable pause." 12 3
Both of these arguments are conspicuously absent from the
Supreme Court's analysis in Drye. Because neither had found its way
into the advocates' briefs, 12 4 one can understand the Court's failure to
raise either sua sponte. Doubtless, the thinness of the Court's analysis
in Drye traces in part to the shortcomings of the arguments with which
it was presented. 12 5 But there may be more to it than that. As a number
of commentators have now observed, the diligence of the Justices often
appears to flag when they depart from the lofty issues of constitutional
law upon which they lavish so much effort. 12 6 The odds and ends that
remain-the tax cases, the TANF cases, the securities regulation
cases-although no less important in their own way, seem regularly to
receive short shrift. In a word, the Justices find cases like Drye too dry.
They bore the Justices. The instant opinion offers a stark reminder that
judicial attention is a scarce resource, which courts may or may not

allocate optimally. 12 7

121. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 60 (1999).
122. See Brief for the Respondent, Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999) (No. 98-1101),
1999 WL 33510170 (omitting any mention of the issue).
123. Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 152 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 1998).
124. See supra notes 119, 122.
125. In particular, Drye's attorney appears to have been out of his depth. His nalve analysis
of one issue of construction of the tax code elicited laughter (apparently from the Justices), and he
conceded that "I'm not a tax expert." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 99, at *8.
Inaugurating the oral argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist had appeared to sense trouble: "Mr.
Traylor. You're the only lawyer to come by himself we've seen in a long time." Id. at *3. Later,
when the Justice Department attorney rose to respond to the unconventional presentation, Justice
Scalia interrupted: "Mr. Jones, you don't have a stick that you're going to turn into a snake or
anything like that, do you?" Id. at *16.
126. E.g., John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 21719 (discussing an ERISA case); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordination
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 247-48. For references to additional
observations, see Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence,76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1348 n.76
(2003).
127. Possibly, it did not help that in Drye Justice Ginsburg wrote for a unanimous Court.
Drye, 528 U.S. at 51. Unanimity might have reflected indifference on the part of some Justices to
the outcome of this case. But unanimity could also have diminished Justice Ginsburg's incentive

1896

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:6:1873

B. Medicaid
Medicaid provides medical benefits to citizens in financial
distress. An inheritance relieves that distress and can cause a citizen to
become ineligible for Medicaid. In turn, a beneficiary might disclaim an
inheritance in an effort to maintain his or her eligibility. This scenario
resembles the problem of disclaimers thwarting the tax commissioner,
in that they can function to create (as opposed to leave unsatisfied) a
government liability. Either way, disclaimers would take a toll on the
public fisc.
In short, disclaimers motivated by Medicaid planning again
implicate a federal interest. But at the same time, Congress insists on
sharing the cost of funding the Medicaid program with the states. 128
Although the primary motivation for this decision doubtless was
budgetary, it has implications for federalism in that Congress
succeeded in aligning national interests with those of local jurisdictions
in this instance. Medicaid planning threatens both, and states cannot
disaggregate one set of interests from the other.
Accordingly, Congress can delegate without fear in this area. Far
from acting to preempt state law, Congress expressly authorizes states
to establish their own rules of eligibility, subject to loose federal
guidelines, such as a requirement of "reasonab[ility]."129 Under the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of 1993130 and the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005,131 Congress did impinge on states' freedom to set
those rules, but only selectively, foreclosing discrete estate planning
strategies. 132 OBRA can be read to preclude eligibility created by
disclaimers, although the legislation does not refer to disclaimers
expressly. The Act requires states to treat as an asset relevant to
determining eligibility any "resources which the individual . . . is

entitled to but does not receive because of action" taken by that

to craft an effortful opinion. After all, nothing concentrates the mind like the immediate prospect
of criticism and contradiction.
128. The fraction of the program paid for by the federal government varies from state to state
on the basis of each state's per capita income. The federal contribution ranges between 50% for
the richest states and 83% for the poorest states. See 2 HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES § 25:2, at 336 (4th ed. 2005).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2012). For preemption analysis with regard to Medicaid
legislation, see Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 74-79 (1st Cir.
2001), affd sub nom. Pharm. Research & Mfes. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003); In re
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 63-68 (Minn. 2008).
130. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
131. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
132. Thomas D. Begley, Jr. & Andrew H. Hook, Medicaid PlanningIs More ChallengingAfter
Recent Reforms, EST. PLAN., May, 2006, at 3.
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individual (or by a party acting on his or her behalf). 133 Nevertheless,
Congress failed to spell out the implications of this requirement.
With few exceptions, state courts testing the issue, both before
and since 1993, have judged disclaimers ineffective to render
beneficiaries eligible for Medicaid. 134 Wherever courts have allowed
them, state legislators have reacted promptly to overturn the
decisions. 135 No federal court has yet spoken to the matter. 136 The best
reason to federalize the rule, either through an amendment or judicial
construction of OBRA, is simply to resolve the question more

133. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1).
134. See State v. Murtha, 427 A.2d 807, 808-10 (Conn. 1980) (construing a state statute
requiring permission from the state commissioner to transfer property received while the
beneficiary is a Medicaid recipient to bar a disclaimer, and observing in dicta that the state can
reassess Medicaid eligibility on the basis of the inheritance); State v. Culligan, No. CV-940705568S, 1995 WL 470255, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 28, 1995) (same); Troy v. Hart, 697
A.2d 113, 117-19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (holding that a disclaimer was allowed but disqualified
the beneficiary for Medicaid without discussing OBRA); Hoesly v. Neb. Dep't Soc. Sers., 498
N.W.2d 571, 575-76 (Neb. 1993) (holding that the disclaimer of an inheritance that would
disqualify the beneficiary for Medicaid is valid but results in disqualification only if the disclaimer
was carried out for the purpose of maintaining eligibility, applying a state statute); Molloy v. Bane,
631 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913-15 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that a disclaimer was allowed but disqualified
the beneficiary for Medicaid, without discussing OBRA); Keuning v. Perales, 593 N.Y.S.2d 653,
654 (App. Div. 1993) (same); In re Baird, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971, 973-75 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (same, and
allowing a fiduciary to disclaim on behalf of an incompetent beneficiary under these conditions);
In re Scrivani's Estate, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509-11 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (same, but refusing to ratify a
fiduciary's disclaimer on behalf of an incompetent beneficiary under these conditions);
Hinschberger ex rel. Olsonv. Griggs Cnty. Soc. Sers., 499N.W.2d 876, 880 (N.D. 1993) (concluding
in dicta that a disclaimer is allowed but can disqualify the disclaimant for Medicaid, applying an
amended state statute); Schell v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 80 A3d 844, 848-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2013) (holding that a disclaimer was allowed but disqualified the disclaimant for Medicaid, citing
to OBRA and applying a state statute amended to parrot the relevant language in OBRA); Tannler
v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Sers., 564 N.W.2d 735, 737, 739-41 (Wis. 1997) (concluding in dicta
that OBRA, which is incorporated by reference into the state statute, allows a disclaimer but
disqualifies the disclaimant from Medicaid). But see In re Estate of Kirk, 591 N.W.2d 630, 634
(Iowa 1999) (concluding in dicta that "a disclaimer cannot be viewed as a scheme to circumvent
the Medicaid eligibility provisions," without discussing OBRA); In re Estate of Schiffman, 430
N.Y.S.2d 229, 230-31 (Sur. Ct. 1980) (allowing a disclaimer by a decedent's estate that might
thwart a claim against the estate for reimbursement of improper Medicaid payments); Nielsen v.
Cass Cnty. Soc. Sers. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 159-60 (N.D. 1986) (holding that a disclaimer was
allowed and did not disqualify the disclaimant for Medicaid, applying a state statute prior to its
amendment).
135. In North Dakota, a holding by the state supreme court in 1986 that a disclaimer would
not affect the disclaiming beneficiary's eligibility for Medicaid, see Nielsen, 395 N.W.2d at 159-60,
provoked the legislature in 1987 to amend the relevant state statute expressly to the contrary. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-02(1) (2013). A decade later in Iowa, a mere dictum by the state
supreme court in 1999 that a disclaimer would not affect the disclaiming beneficiary's eligibility
for Medicaid, see Kirk, 591 N.W.2d at 634, sufficed to prompt the legislature in 2000 to adopt a
parallel amendment. See IOWA CODE §§ 249A.3(11)(c), 633E.15 (2013).
136. A federal court would of course have jurisdiction to construe OBRA. See 2 MCCORMICK,
supra note 128, § 31:1, at 523-25.
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expeditiously, as previously discussed. 137 Thus far, only four states have
enacted legislation explicitly addressing disclaimers as a means of
Medicaid planning, 138 and holdings by a high court in only two other
states speak to the practice. 139 Federal law would thus replace no law
in a large majority of jurisdictions.
In crafting that law, the rationale for suppression of Medicaid
planning is clear. The program exists to benefit the "truly needy," not
those who "created their own need," as one court has put it. 140 If allowed
to determine Medicaid eligibility, disclaimers would impose an
"unnecessar[y] ... burden" on taxpayers. 41 1
One might nevertheless ground a more liberal rule on implicit
testamentary intent. 142 But the point appears less clear here than in
connection with taxation, where only financial well-being is involved,
and where taxpayers have other means to improve their well-being-to
wit, bankruptcy or a compromise agreement. 143 Ideally, a benefactor
wishing to care for a Medicaid recipient would establish a discretionary
"supplemental needs trust" that contributes benefits to him or her only
above and beyond those that the state provides, which current law
accepts as not disqualifying the recipient from state aid.14 4 In the
absence of such planning, a disclaimer that thwarts Medicaid
authorities might appear a Pyrrhic victory, leaving the recipient to
make do with the minimal support that government provides.
Suggested one judge, "I am not yet willing to concede that our society,
at least in North Dakota, is at a place where we should assume that
decedents would cast their relatives on the welfare rolls to reserve their

137. See supra text accompanying note 13.
138. IOWA CODE §§ 249A.3(11)(c), 633E.15 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. §39-709(e)(1) (2013); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-02(1) (2013); VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-325.02(B) (2014).
139. Both opinions predate OBRA. See Murtha, 427 A2d at 808-10 (establishing Connecticut
law); Hoesly, 498 N.W.2d at 575-76 (establishing Nebraska law).
140. Molloy v. Bane, 631 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (App. Div. 1995); see also, e.g., Tannler v. Wis.
Dep't of Health & Soc. Sers., 564 N.W.2d 735, 741 (Wis. 1997) (similar statement).
141. Tannier, 564 N.W.2d at 741; see also Troy v. Hart, 697 A.2d 113, 117-18 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1997) (rejecting a rule allowing disclaimants to qualify for Medicaid as "ludicrous"); Hoesly,
498 N.W.2d at 575 (asserting a public policy "to prevent citizens from raiding the public purse
when they possess sufficient resources to care for themselves"); In re Baird, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971, 97374 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (urging the legislature to strengthen the rules limiting the right of disclaimants
to receive Medicaid as a matter of "[r]esponsible public policy"); In re Scrivani's Estate, 455
N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (asserting that a rule disqualifying disclaimants from Medicaid
follows from "common sense").
142. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
143. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
144. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 27:8, at 433.
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estate for other family members."14 5 But the matter might hinge on the
size of the bequest relative to the Medicaid support obligation.
Be this as it may, we can distinguish tax-inspired disclaimers
from Medicaid-inspired disclaimers at another level. The would-be
disclaimant in a Medicaid case retains the right to disclaim. The
question instead concerns the consequences of his or her disclaimer.
Lawmakers can concede the right to disclaim on the basis of testators'
intent but at the same time insist that the scope of government
obligations-in which testators have no property interest-is instead
up to the will of the people.1 4 6
IV. DISCLAIMERS AND FEDERAL REGULATION

Suppose a participant accumulates wealth within an ERISA
pension plan. The plan will pay the participant an annuity upon
retirement; but in case he or she dies while still employed, and hence
prior to annuitizing the pension, the participant can designate a
beneficiary to inherit undistributed pension benefits. Does a beneficiary
who wishes to decline those benefits do so under the rules of disclaimer
established by state or by federal law?
Disputes concerning this question arise between private parties,
not between a citizen and an agency of government. The nature of the
parties might suggest that state law governs; but at the same time, the
federal ERISA statute serves to regulate employee benefit plans. And
although the statute fails to address disclaimers, it could be read to
cover them implicitly. For ERISA mandates that "the provisions of this
title . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they

may ... relate to any employee benefit plan."14 7
Whether this language, "conspicuous for its breadth,"14 8 brings
disclaimers of ERISA benefits within the ambit of federal law remains
unclear. The legislative history of ERISA suggests that Congress
intended to impose traditional field preemption in this instance.14 9

145. Nielsen v. Cass Cnty. Soc. Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 162 (N.D. 1986) (Vande Walle, J.,
dissenting).
146. If they wished to compensate for poor estate planning by testators, however, lawmakers
could do so by implying supplemental needs trusts whenever testators bequeath to Medicaid
recipients.
147. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012)
(emphasis added).
148. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
149. ERISA would "preempt the field for Federal regulations." 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Williams); see also id. at 29,197 (statement of Rep. Dent) (suggesting that
ERISA reserves for the federal government "the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit
plans").
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Early U.S. Supreme Court opinions on point nevertheless construed the
express grant of preemption within ERISA more comprehensively,
raising questions about whether Congress "intend[ed] [the ERISA
preemption section] to cut nearly so broad a swath in the field of State
laws as the Court's expansive construction will create," 150 and possibly
implicating concerns over "process federalism." 15 1 More recent opinions
by the Court have relented, however, calling for a more restrained
reading of ERISA preemption lest it "never run its course." 152
In the only case yet to address the issue directly, Nickel v. Estate
of Estes, 153 a federal district court ruled in 1997 that state disclaimer
law is "'peripheral' to [an employee benefit] plan and thus would not be
preempted under ERISA." 154 The district court applied the state
disclaimer statute to give effect to a disclaimer of pension benefits
submitted by the executor of a decedent beneficiary, which only some
states allow. 155 On appeal, however, the circuit court ruled that "the
district court erred by reaching the preemption issue in the first
place" 15 6 because the employee benefit plan itself set out the terms for
an effective disclaimer, superseding state law. 157 The court went on to
invalidate the disclaimer because the court construed the plan to allow
only beneficiaries themselves to disclaim-hence holding, in effect, that
a plan's rule of disclaimer could narrow a generally applicable legal rule
of disclaimer. 158 The court further suggested in dicta that the legal rule

150. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel.
Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 154 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that a broad reading of ERISA
preemption would "threaten[] results that Congress could not have intended"); Cal. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335-36 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (warning likewise that such a broad reading would create "a degree of pre-emption
that no sensible person could have intended").
151. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for ProcessFederalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001)
(addressing the contention by propounders of process federalism that institutional safeguards
operate to check the expansion of federal authority).
152. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995), the case which marked the sea change)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 153 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[W]e ... can give the statute both a plausible and precise content, only by interpreting the 'relate
to' clause as a reference to our ordinary pre-emption jurisprudence."); id. at 153-54 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (observing the trend in ERISA preemption case law).
153. 122 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 1997).
154. Id. at 297 (quoting the unpublished district court opinion).
155. Id. at 298. For discussions of disclaimers by executors (or other fiduciaries) on behalf of
deceased (or other) beneficiaries, see sources cited infra note 202.
156. Nickel, 122 F.3d at 298.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 298-99. The dissent disputed the majority's construction of the plan, arguing that
an executor could, in fact, disclaim on behalf of a decedent beneficiary under the terms of the plan.
Id. at 301-03 (Garza, J., dissenting).
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would have been federal, because disclaimer "law would 'relate' to the
plan and thus be preempted."15 9
Twelve years later, in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator,16 0 the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the effectiveness of a waiver during the
plan participant's lifetime (which the Court treated as a type of
disclaimer) of pension benefits, included in a divorce decree, that failed
to conform to the execution requirements for a disclaimer mandated by
the terms of the employee benefit plan. 161 The Court confirmed in dicta
that had it met the terms of the plan, the disclaimer would have taken
effect. 162 Because it did not, however, the beneficiary was not bound by
it. The plan's rule of disclaimer superseded the generally applicable law
of disclaimer, the Court again ruled. 163
Once more, though, the Court failed to reach the issue of what
the generally applicable rule was. Although the opinion referred
repeatedly to that rule as "federal common law," 164 the Court in
Kennedy never carried out a preemption analysis. Nor should the
Court's references to federal common law even qualify as dicta, because
the Court framed the issue in hypothetical terms: "[The argument is
that the waiver should be treated as a creature of federal common
law," 165 but that the plan's terms overrode it. The Court declined to offer
guidance on a case where "the plan documents provide no means for a
beneficiary to renounce an interest in benefits." 166 Subsequent cases
have tested the limits of the ruling in Kennedy, but without revisiting
the preemption issue. 167
159. Id. at 300 (majority opinion).

160. 555 U.S. 285 (2009).
161. Id. at 288-90.
162. Id. at 303. The Court also observed in dicta that a properly executed disclaimer of pension
benefits would not run afoul of a provision of ERISA forbidding a beneficiary from "assign[ing] or
alienat[ing]" benefits under a plan, see Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974
§ 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2012), looking by analogy to the traditional rule that
beneficiaries of an interest in an inalienable spendthrift trust are free to disclaim the interest
initially. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 294-95.
163. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 303. The Court called this the "plan documents rule." Id.
164. Id. at 288, 290-91, 299, 302-03; see also Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension
Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding, without analysis, that federal common
law governs the effectiveness under ERISA of waivers tied to divorce decrees but without
analogizing such waivers to disclaimers), abrogatedby Kennedy, 555 U.S. 285.
165. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 303 n. 13. Kennedy nowhere cited to Nickel. See Kennedy, 555 U.S. 285.
167. See Matschiner v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 622 F.3d 885, 887-88 (8th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the plan documents rule forecloses an anticipatory waiver of plan benefits if the plan
itself contained no "formal procedures" for carrying out such waivers); see also Boyd v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 138, 142-44 (4th Cir. 2011) (same holding, further distinguishing the absence of
a procedure for executing anticipatory waivers under a plan from the absence of a procedure for
executing disclaimersunder a plan, in which event "strict application of the plan documents rule
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Considering the question in the abstract, several options present
themselves. Lawmakers could leave disclaimers of qualified benefit
plans to state law. From the standpoint of legal process, lawmakers
could accomplish that result in several alternative ways. Congress
could expressly incorporate by reference the state law of disclaimers
into ERISA, 168 although that has not occurred-ERISA never mentions
disclaimers. Courts could rule that, given ERISA's silence, federal
common law "borrows" (to use the term of art found in the cases) the
individual state's law, in this instance disclaimer law. 169 Finally, courts
could instead hold that ERISA preemption fails to extend to the law of
disclaimers, hence leaving state law in place. All of these means would
achieve the same result and therefore coincide from the perspective of
policy.
A second possibility is that lawmakers could deem the law of
disclaimers to come within ERISA preemption. That still leaves several
alternatives, however. On the one hand, ERISA could, either by virtue
of its current silence or by express amendment, be construed to preclude
any disclaimer not expressly permitted by plan documents. On the
other hand, courts could create a uniform, federal common law of
disclaimers of pension benefits to fill the statutory silence, coming into
play if and when plan documents fail to provide for disclaimers. Finally,
Congress could amend ERISA to install a federal statutory law of
disclaimers.
In contemplating these choices, we need have no fear that state
lawmakers would discriminate for or against an ERISA beneficiary in
some way. They would have no reason to do so-no negative externality
appears in this situation. Those state disclaimer statutes that speak
expressly to ERISA pension benefits as a category include the reference
to amalgamate them unequivocally with other inherited property
covered by the statutes. 170
One rationale for federally imposed uniformity is avoidance of
conflicts-of-law litigation. 171 The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized
this concern in connection with ERISA preemption of state laws that
would create the absurd result of forcing the beneficiary to take benefits that he would not want,"
but without exploring whether state or federal law would otherwise control disclaimers of plan
benefits).
168. A provision of the Bankruptcy Code operates in this way, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A)
(2012) (determining what comprises exempt property in bankruptcy by reference to state law), as
do other federal statutes. Mishkin, supra note 31, at 802 n.22.
169. E.g., Schadelv. Iowa Interstate R.R., 381 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2004); Cadle v. Shelton,
No. 2:11-CV-00787, 2013 WL 1282372, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2013).
170. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 267(b)(12) (West 2014); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 21. 11(b)(1) (McKinney 2014); TEx. EST. CODE ANN. § 122.001(1)(G) (West 2013).
171. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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revoke by implication beneficiary designations upon a divorce. 172 In
connection with disclaimers, however, conflicts of law present no
danger. The plan documents might themselves contain a choice-of-law
provision (in which event, the problem should not arise in connection
with implied revocation either). 173 Otherwise, under state law, the
applicable rule is simple and clear: The domicile of the decedent governs
disclaimers. 174 The fact that the decedent might have migrated from
one state to another is irrelevant and so is the possibility that the
decedent and beneficiaries reside in different states.
The congressional debates over ERISA suggest that its
preemption provision stemmed from a related concern: achieving
administrative efficiency. Faced with divergent state regulations, plan
administrators for a national company would have to "master the
relevant laws of 50 States" 175 requiring them to "keep certain records in
some States but not in others; .

.

. to process claims in a certain way in

some States but not in others; and to comply with certain fiduciary
standards in some States but not in others." 176 By allowing plan
administrators to follow "a set of standard procedures" instead, federal
lawmakers can alleviate that "burden," which employers might
otherwise "offset by lowering benefit levels." 1 77 This desideratum, we
may recall, corresponds with another one of the theoretical
justifications for federalizing rules-to wit, minimizing the information
costs of compliance with law by the citizenry. 178
Now, the most radical means of simplifying a plan
administrator's responsibilities would be to confine them to those
enumerated by plan documents. A court could read ERISA's current
silence on the subject of disclaimers as intended to bar any disclaimer
not expressly authorized by the plan itself.
172. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149 (2001); cf id. at 158 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (wondering how serious this concern is "in practice").
173. Baude, supra note 29, at 1420.
174. In re Laughlin, 602 F.3d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 2010); Gen. Fin. Corp. v. Hansen (In re Estate
of Hansen), 248 N.E.2d 709, 711, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969); Lehr v. Switzer, 239 N.W. 564, 565-66
(Iowa 1931); In re Estate of Horowitz, 531 A.2d 1364, 1365-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987);
Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d 224, 224-26 (Sur. Ct. 1992); John Deere Credit Co. v. Goldammer
(In re Estate of Goldammer), 405 N.W.2d 693, 693, 695 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 79-37-011 (May 31, 1979). No contrary precedents have ever appeared. But cf. Kaufman v.
Richmond, 811 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Mass. 2004) (raising the possibility that disclaimers of real
property are governed by the law of the situs).
175. Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 149-50.
176. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987).
177. Id. at 9-10. The Court supported this analysis with quotations from the Congressional
Record. Id. at 9, 11 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197, 29,993 (1974) (statements of Rep. Dent and
Sen. Williams); H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4650).
178. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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The U.S. Supreme Court shrank from such a ruling in Kennedy.
Although it stressed the importance of "hewing to the directives of the
plan documents," 179 the Court in dicta asserted "[t]he improbability that
a statute [ERISA] written with an eye on the old law would effectively
force a beneficiary to take an interest willy-nilly." 18 0 Added the Court:
"Common sense and common law both say that 'the law certainly is not
so absurd as to force a man to take an estate against his will.' "181
Historically, though, that is exactly what the common law (if not
common sense) declared in connection with intestate estates. Intestate
property was "cast" upon the heir and could not be disclaimed under the
common law, 182 a rule that persisted in several American states as late
as the 1990s but that is now superseded everywhere by statute. 183
Given that beneficiaries can gift unwanted pension wealth on to
third parties, the loss of a right to disclaim in this instance would at
most implicate tax inefficiencies. That result might make bad tax policy
by taxing pension wealth arbitrarily, but it hardly amounts to an
absurdity. The efficiencies that result when a plan administrator can
rely exclusively on plan documents might outweigh the damage caused
by plans that fail to provide any mechanism for disclaiming. 184 But if
we eschew this possibility and accept that ERISA should implicitly
incorporate some law of disclaimer dehors plan documents, even if plan
documents can substitute their own, then the assumption that plan
administrators would prefer to observe federal common law rather than
to follow the fifty state laws of disclaimer is scarcely self-evident.
Obviously, the downside of state laws is that they offer
administrators no single prototype to follow. What is more, state laws
of disclaimer have steadily fragmented over time. The reasons are
structural. In the nineteenth century, only a few discrete areas of
inheritance law-the rules of intestacy, the formalizing rules for wills,
the rights of a surviving spouse-were codified. Disclaimer law was not.
Because it was largely composed of standards serving as persuasive
authority across state lines, the common law tended to vary little from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 185 The subsequent "orgy of statute
179. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. and Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300 (2009).
180. Id. at 294-95.
181. Id. at 295 (quoting Townson v. Tickell, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 575 (K.B.) 576-77).
182. Hirsch, supranote 44, at 591.
183. E.g., Bradleyv. State, 123 A.2d 148, 151 (N.H. 1956) (dicta). The last two states to abolish
the common-law prohibition on disclaimers of intestate inheritance were Mississippi and New
Hampshire, in 1994 and 1996 respectively. See supra note 2.
184. Taxation is not inescapable in this scenario, since the transfer could qualify as a "transfer
disclaimer" under the tax code. See supra note 4.
185. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 74 (1982) ("The
common law had a substantial degree of uniformity.").
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making" 186 in the United States swept up inheritance law. 187 Today
every state has its own probate code and its own disclaimer statute,
augmented by common law where gaps remain but covering large
swaths of the legal landscape previously governed by judge-made law.
This trend encouraged pluralism by sharpening standards into more
variable rules, by freeing statutory law from prior case-based
precedent, and by weakening the gravitational pull of a legal system no
longer premised on commonality. 188 Ironically, the uniform acts for
inheritance and disclaimer law, first promulgated in 1969,189 have, if
anything, exacerbated the tropism toward diversity. Unlike the
Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Probate Code and related
products have never gained anything close to universal adoption, but
they did succeed in stirring things up, encouraging more states to codify
and to reexamine and fiddle with statutes already in place. Even those
jurisdictions that adopted uniform acts covering disclaimer law have
insisted on tinkering with them. As of today, some seventeen states
have enacted the latest version of the Uniform Probate Code's
provisions on disclaimer (grafted into that code from a freestanding
uniform act 90 )-and these have proliferated into seventeen different
variations of state law. 191

So, the state laws of disclaimer are variegated. A federal
common law of disclaimers would function to reduce this potpourri to a
consolidated body of law for plan administrators to follow. But
consolidation in this instance would come at a price: for no federal
common law of disclaimers comparable to the "federal law merchant" 1 92
yet exists. Of course, courts developing such a law would not have to
make a clean sweep of the subject. Federal common law can draw on
preexisting state statutes, state common law, and other federal law. 193
Doubtless, the federal statute governing the validity of disclaimers for

186. Id. at 73.
187. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 302-08 (3d ed.
2005) (surveying the American codification movement).
188. Judge Calabresi hinted at the phenomenon. See CALABRESI, supra note 185, at 74, 7677. See generally Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law:
An Evolutionary Comparison,37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2008).
189. UNIF. PROBATE CODE historical notes (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 23 (2013).
190. Id. §§ 2-1102 to -1117, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 386-412; UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS
ACT §§ 1-21 (amended 2010), 8A U.L.A. 159-89 (2003).
191. Hirsch, supranote 43, at 370.
192. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). This body of doctrine
'stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules." Id.
193. See, e.g., City of Evansville, Ind. v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1021 n.43
(7th Cir. 1979) ("Although federal common law controls, federal statutes as well as state statutory
and common law are nonetheless highly relevant.").
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tax purposes,1 94 as elaborated by federal regulations and case law,
would prove influential. 195 But all of this would take time-quite a lot
of time, in fact, if splits developed between circuits over what the federal
common law should be. 196 In the meantime, plan administrators would
face consolidated uncertainty. They are likely to regard that sort of
consolidation as a mixed blessing. Courts have highlighted the value of
certainty in connection with ERISA. 197
Consider a few of the issues that might arise. ERISA pension
plans often name alternative beneficiaries in the event that a primary
beneficiary predeceases the plan participant. If the primary beneficiary
instead disclaims the inheritance, plan administrators must apply a
rule of construction to plan documents: Should the term "predeceasing"
be construed broadly to include disclaiming, so that the alternative
beneficiary takes the inheritance in place of the disclaimant?1 9 8 In some
states, the disclaimer statute answers this question; in others, case law
fills the gap. At any rate, the rule varies from state to state.19 9 What
would the federal common law rule be? 2 00 Or consider the issue
presented in Nickel. 20 1 Some type of fiduciary of a beneficiary might
seek to disclaim on his or her behalf. Should the plan administrator now
operate on the assumption that the disclaimer is valid and final? State
statutes often feature detailed but varying rules as to who, other than
beneficiaries themselves, has authority to execute a disclaimer. 202
194. I.R.C. § 2518 (2012).
195. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,858 (Sept. 9, 1991) (concluding that a disclaimer is valid
under ERISA "if the disclaimer satisfies (1) the four requirements of section 2518(b) and (2) the
requirements of applicable state law").
196. Mishkin, supra note 31, at 813, 819; supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
197. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 301 (2009)
(suggesting that "the cost of less certain rules would be too plain.... [They] would destroy a plan
administrator's ability... to get clear distribution instructions, without going into court"); Egelhoff
v. Egelhoffex. rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149 n.3 (2001) (adding that even if the plan administrator
can [pass on] the costs of delay and uncertainty . .. to beneficiaries," by "let[ting] courts or parties
settle the matter," uncertainty still "thwart[s] ERISA's objective of efficient plan administration").
198. Ideally, as is sometimes the case, plan documents establish alternative beneficiaries in
the express event of a disclaimer, thereby resolving the ambiguity. Harvey B. Wallace, II,
Retirement Benefits Planning Update, PROB. & PROP., May-June 2002, at 45, 48.
199. Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 60, at 163 n.263, 169 n.288.
200. This issue has arisen in connection with federal common law barring inheritance by
slayers, by analogy. See Ahmed v. Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d 424, 432-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding
irrelevant a plan document naming an alternative beneficiary where the primary beneficiary slays
and thus constructively predeceases the plan participant); see also Box v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., No. 4:1 1-CV-0829-MHH, 2014 WL 4926285, at *5 n.3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 1, 2014) (observing, upon
a review, that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether ERISA preempts state law
governing inheritance by slayers).
201. Nickel v. Estate of Estes, 122 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 1997).
202. E. DIANE THOMPSON, DISCLAIMERS: WHEN, WHY & How TO SAY NO TO AN INHERITANCE

37-41 (2000); WENIG, supra note 1, at A-53 to A-54; Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 60, at 132-38.
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Federal common law would now have to emerge on this question. Or
consider the issue raised in Drye. 203 Can the beneficiary of a defined
benefit plan disclaim despite the fact that he or she is insolvent? Once
more, state statutes and case law appear on point, and the rule again
varies. 204 Federal common law on the subject has yet to materialize. 205
And so on, and so on.
To be sure, state laws of disclaimer sometimes exhibit
uncertainty, too. At present, only around half the states have
announced a clear rule governing the validity of insolvent disclaimers,
for example. 206 Parties might have to iron out issues of law in court
either way. Nevertheless, state lawmakers have a centuries-long lead
over federal ones in this field. In such circumstances, interstitial
lawmaking holds considerable appeal. 207
If minded to do so, Congress could curtail the uncertainty of
federal law by amending ERISA to provide express rules of disclaimer,
at least as a default regime where plan documents are silent. But even
then, other costs could potentially arise. From the perspective of plan
administrators, recourse to state disclaimer law would cause
indistinguishable plans to become subject to different rules of
disclaimer, marginally increasing the costs of plan administration. That
inconsistency, and cost, disappears if we shift to a consolidated body of
federal law. But from the perspective of beneficiaries, introducing a
federal law for qualified pension plans means that different forms of
property will come under separate rules of disclaimer. Beneficiaries
who receive property under both a will and a pension plan would have
to follow two inconsistent rules of disclaimer, raising their information
costs (which, unlike costs borne by plan administrators, are incurred
individually, perhaps in the form of marginally higher attorneys' fees,
affording no economies of scale). If state disclaimer law holds sway over
all forms of property, we avoid that complication. In other words, we

203. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
204. Hirsch, supra note 44, at 592-601; Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 60, at 154-55; Hirsch,
supra note 43, at 367-68. For the most recent case to address this issue, see Gallaher v. Riddle,
850 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. 2004) (holding invalid an insolvent disclaimer).
205. On federal law applicable to insolvent disclaimers of property of all sorts in a bankruptcy
proceeding, see infra Part V.
206. Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 60, at 155. The current version of the Uniform Probate
Code does not help matters. It was intended to incorporate prior state common law on insolvent
disclaimer, but a section of the Code has the unintended consequence of permitting insolvent
disclaimer, a result the Reporter for this section of the Code now acknowledges, but which the
comments accompanying the Code nowhere explicate. Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimer Law and
UDPIA's Unintended Consequences, EST. PLAN., Apr. 2009, at 34, 39-40; Hirsch, supra note 43, at
367-68.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32; cf supra text accompanying note 13.
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face a trade-off: Either alternative implicates inconsistency (and costs)
of one kind or another. We can avoid both inconsistencies only by
federalizing disclaimer law in toto-but no such proposal is on the table,
even assuming it could pass constitutional muster.
If we accept the logic of applying existing state disclaimer law to
ERISA, federal lawmakers could still find reason to carve out one or
more exceptions. For disclaimers of benefits under qualified benefit
plans do raise problems that, if not unique to ERISA, differ from the
problems generated by disclaimers of property in general. In particular,
plan administrators ought to receive notice of a disclaimer, if only to
clarify their responsibilities. Some state disclaimer statutes anticipate
the issue; the Uniform Probate Code establishes special notice
requirements for all "interests created by a beneficiary designation,"
which would include interests in a qualified benefit plan. 2 08 If it covers
personal property, as a pension plan would, the disclaimer "must be
delivered to the person obligated to distribute the interest." 2 09
Nonetheless, many states fail to carve out this exception from the
general laws of disclaimer. 2 10 Along the same lines, federal lawmakers
might wish to exonerate plan administrators who act in good faith on
the assumption that a disclaimer is valid or who make a distribution to
a beneficiary who has disclaimed without their knowledge. Courts have
identified "avoid[ance of] double liability" as one of ERISA's values. 211
Although several states include exoneration provisions applicable to
plan administrators (among others) in their disclaimer statutes, the
Uniform Probate Code does not. 2 12 Federal common or statutory law
focused on the distinct characteristics of pension wealth does appear
warranted, but it need cover only a few stitches in the fabric of
disclaimer law.

208. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1112(a)(4), (g) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 404 (2013). See,
e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.290 (6), (12)(d) (LexisNexis 2013).
209. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1112(g)(1), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A 404. A comparable rule exists under
some non-uniform disclaimer statutes. E.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(c)(2)
(McKinney 2014).
210. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2 80(a) (West 2014) (permitting, but not requiring, a
disclaimer to be filed with the "person responsible for distributing the interest to the beneficiary").
211. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. and Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 301 (2009) (quoting
Fox Valley & Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 366.
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V. DISCLAIMERS AND FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS
We come finally to the problem of disclaimers of inheritances
adjudicated within a federal bankruptcy proceeding. 2 13 Here, the issue
of creditors' claims retakes center stage, as in connection with tax
liens. 2 14 Now, though, the context of the issue widens from federal
creditors to general creditors. The federal government's connection
stems not from its mercenary interests but from its exclusive role in
providing a forum and a process as mandated by congressional
legislation. 215
The temporal dimension of the problem adds a further
complication. A disclaimer judged in bankruptcy could arise at different
moments in time. An insolvent debtor might both come into an
inheritance and disclaim it prior to bankruptcy-a prepetition
disclaimer. Alternatively, an insolvent debtor could succeed to an
inheritance, then enter bankruptcy, and subsequently seek to
disclaim-a postpetition disclaimer of a prepetition inheritance.
Finally, an insolvent debtor could enter bankruptcy and subsequently
both inherit and seek to disclaim-a postpetition disclaimer of a
postpetition inheritance. Although the petition for relief in bankruptcy
ordinarily marks the "line of cleavage" between prepetition
accumulations of property that the debtor must surrender to creditors
and postpetition accumulations that a discharged debtor gets to keep as
his or her "fresh start," the Bankruptcy Code makes an exception for
inherited assets. Any right to an inheritance arising within 180 days of
a petition for relief in Chapter 7 (liquidation), or before the case is closed
in Chapters 12 or 13 (rehabilitation), flows back into the bankruptcy
estate to satisfy creditors under section 541(a)(5) and related sections
of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 16 Accordingly, postpetition inheritances
remain potential points of contention within a federal bankruptcy
proceeding.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether, and under
what circumstances, a disclaimer in bankruptcy comes under federal
common law. Thus far, the Court has declined to hear cases raising this
213. For prior academic discussions of the problem, see Stephen E. Parker, Can Debtors
Disclaim Inheritancesto the Detriment of Their Creditors?,25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 31 (1993); David
B. Young, The Intersection of Bankruptcy and Probate,49 S. TEx. L. REV. 351, 381-92 (2007).
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. Although the federal Bankruptcy Code fails to include an express preemption provision
analogous to the one contained in ERISA, see supra note 147 and accompanying text, case law
concludes that field preemption applies in bankruptcy. For a recent discussion, see Jeffrey B.
Ellman & Brett J. Berlin, Bankruptcy Code Preemption of State Law, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 241 (2012).
216. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(5), 1207(a)(1), 1306(a)(1) (2012).
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issue. 2 1 7 Quite a few such cases have come before lower federal courts,
however. Although we cannot reconcile this mass of decisions sic et non,
they cumulatively suggest that timing plays a crucial role in the
outcome of such cases.
If an insolvent debtor disclaims an inheritance prior to a petition
for relief, the trustee in bankruptcy could challenge the disclaimer's
validity, seeking to recover the inheritance for the bankruptcy estate.
The trustee might do so by recourse to either of two avoiding powers.
To begin with, under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee
can exercise any right that an actual unsecured creditor would have had
to "avoid any transfer" at state law. 2 18 Here, the trustee must rely on
state law, imported into bankruptcy, so the usefulness of this avoiding
power will turn on whether the domicile of the benefactor treats an
insolvent disclaimer as a fraudulent transfer. Some states do as a
matter of common law, although most do not. 2 19
If a state alternatively regulates insolvent disclaimer by statute,
as five currently do, the problem grows a mite more complicated. 220 In
two of these states, the statutes indicate that fraudulent conveyance
law applies to insolvent disclaimers without stating explicitly that it
has the effect of avoiding them. 22 1 Assuming it does have that effect, as
the statutes imply, then insolvent disclaimers are again vulnerable to
section 544(b). In the remaining three states, the statutes specify that
an insolvent disclaimer is "ineffective," or "annulled." 22 2 Courts should
construe this terminology to render the disclaimer a void transfer, still
subject to section 544(b) by virtue of synonymous language, 2 2 3 although
the issue has yet to arise in a published case. 2 2 4
217. See Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 101 B.R. 556 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 925
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991).

218. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
219. Hirsch, supra note 44, at 592-601; Hirsch, Revisions, supranote 60, at 154-55.
220. In a sixth state, the issue is left expressly to common law. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6205(d) (West 2014).
221. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-801(h)(2) (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 756
(2014).
222. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 739.402(2)(d) & (5) (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 967 (2014);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-1106(b)(4) & (f) (West 2014).
223. See supra text accompanying note 218.
224. See Pastimes Publg Co. v. Adver. Displays, 286 N.E.2d 19, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)
("Ineffective [under the pre-1989 version of U.C.C. art. 6] means voidable at the instance of a
creditor of the transferor."); U.C.C. § 6-107 cmt. (1989) (observing in connection with the section
of U.C.C. art. 6 that had formerly deemed bulk sales "ineffective" against a creditor who was not
notified of the sale, see U.C.C. § 6-105 (pre-1989 art. 6), 2C U.L.A. 88 (2005) (revised in 1989 to
give the non-notified creditor instead a cause of action for damages), that, following this revision,
"[b]ecause no creditor has the right to avoid the transaction or to assert a remedy that is the
functional equivalent of avoidance, the seller's bankruptcy trustee likewise should be unable to do
so [under § 544(b)]" (emphasis added)).
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Recall also that by statute in several states today, only
designated exception creditors can avoid an insolvent disclaimer, up to
the value of their claims. 2 2 5 If such a creditor holding a limited claim
exists, then section 544(b) again could apply. Yet in connection with
these statutes, the right to avoid the transfer is potentially enhanced
or, we might say, federalized, by the gloss of Moore v. Bay. 226 In that
famous case, the U.S. Supreme Court construed section 544(b) to give
the trustee in bankruptcy power to avoid any transfer in its entirety,

irrespective of the size of the actual creditor'sclaim, and, on top of that,
to do so for the benefit not of the actual creditor, but for the bankruptcy
estate as a whole-an avoiding power that distorts the result that would
have obtained outside of bankruptcy, under state law. 2 2 7 Moore v. Bay
appears applicable in this scenario, although no published case testing
that proposition has yet materialized. 2 2 8
Alternatively, the trustee in bankruptcy can seek to avoid a
prepetition disclaimer under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
grants the trustee an independent power to avoid fraudulent transfers,
albeit with a shorter reachback period than under section 544(b). 2 29
Federal law establishes the substantive scope of this avoiding power. 230
225. ALASKA STAT. § 13.70.110(f)(1) (2014) (child support creditors); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1511-1213(6) & (7)(b) (2014) (medical assistance benefits creditors of a deceased beneficiary); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-17.5-8-2.5, 32-17.5-8-6 (West 2014) (child support creditors); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 105.643(6) & (7), 105.648, 411.620 (West 2014) (restitution judgment and public assistance
creditors); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 122.107(a) (West 2013) (child support creditors); see supra text
accompanying note 43.
226. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
227. Id. at 5. Although the decision has drawn considerable criticism, Moore U.Bay remains
good law today; the decision successfully leaped from the interstices of the former Bankruptcy Act
to the interstices of the current Bankruptcy Code. For discussions, see THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 79-83 (1986); CHARLES J. TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY

§ 6.6 (3d ed. 2014).
228. One might argue that section 544(b) should not apply to exception creditors, because the
exclusive rights to avoid disclaimers created under these state statutes constitute lien-like rights,
even if they do not technically comprise statutory liens. On this theory, one could argue that
exception creditors do not qualify as "unsecured creditors" for purposes of section 544(b). See 11
U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2012) ("[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest ... by a creditor
holding an unsecured claim ....
). In that event, the exception creditor would become the only
interested party, and the bankruptcy court could then lift the automatic stay to allow the exception
creditor to exercise his or her lien-like right to reach the disclaimed inheritance for his or her own
benefit up to the value of the claim, thereby reproducing the result that would have prevailed
outside of bankruptcy. See id. § 362(a) & (d).
229. Id. § 548. This section applies to any transfer made within two years of the bankruptcy
petition. Id. § 548(a)(1). By comparison, section 544(b) follows whatever statute of limitations
applies at state law, which typically runs to four years. Id. § 544(b); UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT (amended 2014) § 9, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A 194 (2006) (originally UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT (1984)

§ 9).

230. See James Angell McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy
Act, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 385 (1937) (stating, in the author's capacity as one of the drafters of the
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Nevertheless, most courts have ruled that section 548 allows the trustee
to avoid insolvent disclaimers only if creditors could have avoided them
under state law. 2 31
The reasoning in these opinions echoes premises articulated in
the tax lien cases that we unpacked earlier. 232 Under section 548, the
bankruptcy trustee can "avoid any transfer ...

of an interest of the

debtor in property" made either with intent to hinder creditors or in
exchange for less than reasonably equivalent value while the debtor
was insolvent. 233 The federal Bankruptcy Code defines the term
"transfer" broadly to include "each mode, direct or indirect, . . . of

disposing of or parting with property[,] or an interest in property," 234
which could surely include a disclaimer. But, like the Internal Revenue
Code, the Bankruptcy Code fails to define the term "property."2 35 In lieu
of a federal definition, property takes its meaning-and its attributesfrom state law. And as specified in many state disclaimer statutes,
codifying common law, a disclaimer "relates back for all purposes" to
the time when the benefactor died. 2 36 In other words, state law may
deem beneficiaries never to have owned an interest in the property they
disclaimed, and "a 'transfer' cannot occur without 'property' or an
'interest in property,'" as one court put the logic succinctly. 237
Some states, though, reject the notion of a retroactive
displacement of title and regard insolvent disclaimers as fraudulent
transfers. 238 "[T]he legatee obtains power, in itself a limited right of
ownership .

.

. to determine the ultimate disposition of the property,"

one court reasoned typically. 2 39 "If he chooses to [disclaim], he
antecedent of section 548 in the former Bankruptcy Act, that the section "provides ... for a federal
law of fraudulent conveyances").
231. See infra notes 237, 244, 247, and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
233. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(i)-(ii)(I).
234. Id. § 101(54) (subsection symbol omitted).
235. See id. § 101.
236. Hirsch, supra note 44, at 595. This or similar language is today codified in nineteen
states. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1954(a) (2011). The other eighteen are Alabama, California,
Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.
237. Gaughan v. The Edward Dittlof Revocable Trust (In re Costas), 555 F.3d 790, 793-94,
798 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Simpson v. Penner (In re Simpson), 36 F.3d 450, 452-53 (5th Cir. 1994)
(similar analysis); Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 925 F.2d 209, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1991) (same);
Wood v. Bright (In re Bright), 241 B.R. 664, 666-68, 672 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (same); Cassell v.
Kolb, 267 B.R. 861, 867 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir.
2003); Garrett v. Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15, 18-21 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002) (same);
Grassmueck v. Nistler (In re Nistler), 259 B.R. 723, 725-27 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001) (same); In re
Jessen, 82 B.R. 490, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988) (without analysis).
238. Hirsch, supranote 44, at 595-98; Hirsch, supra note 43, at 368.
239. Kalt v. Youngworth (In re Kalt's Estate), 108 P.2d 401, 403 (Cal. 1940).
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determines by that action that the title will pass on to some other heir
or legatee." 240 In these states, the trustee in bankruptcy could avoid
insolvent disclaimers as fraudulent transfers by virtue of either section
548 or section 544(b).241
This reasoning, of course, resembles part of the U.S. Supreme
Court's analysis in Drye.242 There, too, the Court took the view that the
"power to channel the estate's assets" by way of a disclaimer comprises
a form of "dominion" and "warrants the conclusion that [the debtorbeneficiary] held 'property' or 'a right to property,' subject to the
Government's liens" under the tax code. 243 One bankruptcy court has
taken the view that this aspect of the analysis in Drye controls "in all
contexts," rendering insolvent disclaimers fraudulent transfers under
section 548.244 But several subsequent courts, including appellate
courts, reject this analysis, concluding that Drye is doctrinally confined
to "the particularities and structure of the Internal Revenue Code." 2 4 5
This conclusion appears technically sound: Although the relevant
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the tax code display linguistic
similarities, the two cover separate problems and hence can support
conflicting outcomes. 246
But even without applying Drye directly, courts could make an
argument similar to the one that appeared in that opinion. To wit, a
right of disclaimer is both an attribute of property and a species of
transfer. This duality frees courts to consider-or demands that they
consider-the policy implications of focusing on one or the other feature
of a disclaimer when applying section 548. At least one bankruptcy
court antedating Drye pursued this stream of analysis to avoid a
240. Id.
241. See Garrettv. Vaughan (In re Vaughan), 261 B.R. 700, 704, 707 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2001)
(holding a prepetition disclaimer ineffective in bankruptcy because it was improperly executed at
state law); McGraw v. Betz (In re Betz), 84 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (concerning a
postpetition disclaimer rendered invalid by state law); see also Bostian v. Milens, 193 S.W.2d 797,
801 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (holding a prepetition disclaimer ineffective because disclaimers of
intestate inheritances were at that time impermissible under state law) (decided under the former
Bankruptcy Act).
242. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
243. Id. at 61.
244. In re Kloubec, 247 B.R. 246, 255-56 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
245. Laughlin v. Nouveau Body and Tan, L.L.C. (In re Laughlin), 602 F.3d 417, 424-26 (5th
Cir. 2010) (dicta); Gaughan v. Edward Dittlof Revocable Trust (In re Costas), 555 F.3d 790, 79596 (9th Cir. 2009); Cassell v. Kolb, 267 B.R. 861, 866 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 326
F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2003); Garrett v. Bank of Oklahoma (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15, 20 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 2002); Grassmueck v. Nistler (In re Nistler), 259 B.R. 723, 726-27 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001).
246. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2012) (defining "transfer" for the purposes of bankruptcy
as "each mode, direct or indirect, . . . of disposing of or parting with (i) property; or (ii) an interest
in property"), with I.R.C. § 6321 (2012) (extending a federal tax lien to "all property and rights to
property" belonging to a delinquent taxpayer).
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prepetition disclaimer under section 548, even though it would have
been valid at state law. 2 4 7
As a doctrinal matter, the effectiveness of prepetition
disclaimers becomes especially murky in states that have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code. Whereas previous versions of its disclaimer
section had included the traditional phrasing that a disclaimer "relates
back for all purposes," 248 the current version omits this language,
providing simply that "[a] disclaimer . . . is not a transfer." 249 The
accompanying comment suggests that the drafters considered and
intended this novel phrasing as doctrinally equivalent to prior law. 2 50
And, in fact, the change has no consequences from the standpoint of
state law: at common law, if a disclaimer is not a transfer, then it cannot
comprise a fraudulent transfer. 251 But in bankruptcy, this subtle
difference could make all the difference. For section 548 follows the
expansive federal definition of transfer found in the Bankruptcy Code,
preempting the Uniform Probate Code's definition of transfer. 252
Without a retroactive displacement of title from the disclaiming
beneficiary, a disclaimer under the Uniform Probate Code should
become vulnerable to section 548. The only way around this logic is for
a court to find retroactive displacement of title as implicit within
Uniform Probate Code by recourse to purposive rather than textual
construction. Whether courts prove willing to make this move remains
to be seen; what is clear is that the drafters of the Uniform Probate
247. See Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 409-12 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993),
overruled by Simpson v. Penner (In re Simpson), 36 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing that
whereas the Seventh Circuit, in a previous opinion, "says that the relation back feature merely
defines an interest in property, that court actually applies the doctrine to also eliminate the
transfer . . . . [B]y doing so, state law would operate to define the transfer out of existence."
(emphasis in original)); see also Agristor Leasing v. Dinsdale (In re Dinsdale), No. L-92-00669C,
1993 WL 1112064, at *6-7 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 1993) (observing in a case not contesting
the validity of a disclaimer, but instead challenging the discharge because of the disclaimer, that
since "the doctrine of relation-back has one foot in the camp of 'transfer' and one foot in the camp
of 'property'[, t]here can be no clear resolution simply through the use of legal analysis. Policy
considerations must be included in the analysis."); Casciato v. Stevens (In re Stevens), 112 B.R.
175, 176-77 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (reaching the same result as Lowe v. Brajkovic and observing
that "although state law is applied to determine the existence of an interest in property, federal
bankruptcy law is applicable to determine if a transfer of that interest has occurred"). For another
opinion recognizing the duality, in a case decided under the former Bankruptcy Act, see Hoecker
v. U.S. Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d 838, 842 (10th Cir. 1973) (Halloway, J., dissenting).
248. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c) (pre-1990 art. 2), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 617 (2013).
249. Id. § 2-1105(f) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A 391 (2013). Compare the statutory law of
California, which states that a disclaimer is "not a fraudulent transfer" and also indicates that the
disclaimer "relates back for all purposes." CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 282(a)(1), 283 (West 2014).
250. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1105 cmt., 8 pt. 1 U.L.A 392 ("This subsection states the effect
and meaning of the traditional 'relation back' doctrine of prior Acts.").
251. Hirsch, supra note 43, at 367-68.
252. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2012), quoted supra note 246.
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Code failed to anticipate this ramification of their text, producing
needless uncertainty-and raising the prospect of costly litigation-if
and when a bankruptcy proceeding ensues.
In sum, most of the cases tried thus far suggest that state law
governs prepetition disclaimers. Although the Bankruptcy Code affords
the trustee a brace of weapons with which to attack fraudulent
transfers-killing one bird with two stones-both hinge on the validity
of an insolvent disclaimer outside of bankruptcy, in the judgment of
most courts.
Most, but not all, of the cases concerning attempted postpetition
disclaimers have come to a different conclusion. Irrespective of whether
the postpetition disclaimer concerned pre- or postpetition inheritances,
the weight of authority, including appellate authority, holds
postpetition disclaimers subject to federal law, which courts read to
foreclose disclaimers by debtors in bankruptcy. 253
At first sight, this result appears surprising. Although neither
section 544(b) nor section 548 applies to transfers that follow the
petition, section 549, which becomes operative after that point, imposes
equivalent restrictions on the debtor. 254 Under section 549, the trustee
can "avoid a transfer of property of the estate that occurs after the
commencement of the case." 2 55 Courts justify a different outcome by
focusing on the distinct language of section 541(a)(5), drawing
postpetition inheritances back into the bankruptcy estate. 256 The
253. See Alford v. Reed, No. 3:04-CV-0152-B, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19024, at *6-10 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 2, 2005) (postpetition inheritance); In re Johnson, No. 10-91970, 2011 WL 1884584, at
*1-2 (Bankr. CD. Ill. 2011) (postpetition disclaimer of prepetition inheritance, in Chapter 13); In
re Scott, 385 B.R. 709, 710-12 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2008) (postpetition inheritance); Lowe v. Sanflippo
(In re Schmidt), 362 B.R. 318, 319-26 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) (postpetition disclaimer of
prepetition inheritance); Wolfe v. Farrior (In re Farrior), 344 B.R. 483, 485-86 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
2006) (postpetition inheritance); Yellin v. Gilroy (In re Gilroy), 235 B.R. 512, 515-18 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1999) (postpetition inheritance) (dicta); Williams v. Chenoweth (In re Chenoweth), 132 B.R.
161, 164-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 143 B.R. 527, 532-35 (S.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d 1111,
1112-13 (7th Cir. 1993) (postpetition inheritance); Cornelius v. Cornell (In re Cornell), 95 B.R. 219,
220-22 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (postpetition inheritance); Geekie v. Watson (In re Watson), 65
B.R. 9, 11-12 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (postpetition disclaimer of prepetition inheritance); Flanigan
v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 45 B.R. 27, 29-30 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (postpetition inheritance). But
see Barmann v. Wood (In re Wood), 291 B.R. 829, 830-31 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that
debtor could disclaim by virtue of state law where the disclaimer occurred postpetition, without
identifying the date of the inheritance); cf. McGraw v. Betz (In re Betz), 84 B.R. 470, 471-72
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (invalidating a disclaimer of a postpetition inheritance under state law,
so not needing to decide whether federal law would supersede a state law allowing the disclaimer).
For cases decided under the former Bankruptcy Act, see Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen),
610 F.2d 512, 514-20 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Champion, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 645, 647-52 (N.D. Ga.
1975); In re Estate of Dankner, 384 N.Y.S.2d 683, 683-85 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
254. 11 U.S.C. § 549.
255. Id. § 549(a).
256. Id. § 541(a)(5).
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provision applies to inheritances "that the debtor acquires or becomes
entitled to acquire within 180 days" of the petition. 257 This language
forecloses a disclaimer, courts have held, emphasizing the difference
between the provision's current phrasing and that of its analogue under
the former Bankruptcy Act, which applied to any inheritance "which
vests in the bankrupt." 2 58 The fewer cases concerning postpetition
disclaimers of prepetition inheritances either argue that Drye
controlS 2 59 (a doubtful proposition that other courts reject 2 60), or assume
that section 541(a)(5) also applies to prepetition inheritances which
become payable postpetition 261 (an even more doubtful proposition, also
rejected by other courts). 262
The textual history of section 541(a)(5) fails to support the
substantive inference that the provision precludes disclaimers. Courts
have remarked that the analogous provision under the former
Bankruptcy Act "does not expand the property which passes to the
trustee, nor does it diminish it, it merely extends the time for which the
title to property may vest in the trustee." 263 The inclusion within the
bankruptcy estate of inheritances the debtor becomes "entitled to
acquire" as well as those that he or she "acquires," as the current
version of the provision mandates, 264 would not appear to modify this
formula. Rather, the new language clarifies that inheritances need not
become possessory within the 180-day window in order for the provision
to take effect.265 The words "entitled to acquire," followed immediately

257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (second paragraph) (1898) (emphasis added). For cases drawing
this textual conclusion, see Detlefsen, 610 F.2d at 518-20 (dicta); Scott, 385 B.R. at 712; Chenoweth,
132 B.R. at 164, 166; Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 101 B.R. 556, 558 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989)
(dicta), aff'd, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991); Watson, 65 B.R. at 12;
Lewis, 45 B.R. at 29-30; cf. Farrior,344 B.R. at 486 (asserting that the debtor "lost any right to
exercise [a] disclaimer under [state] law because 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1), gives the trustee the duty
to'collect and reduce to money the property of the estate,'" although that provision does not appear
to affect the scope of property of the estate, and specifies a duty that must be limited thereto).
259. Lowe v. Sanflippo (In re Schmidt), 362 B.R. 318, 322-25 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
260. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
261. See Watson, 65 B.R. at 10-11 (concerning life insurance); see also Atchison, 101 B.R. at
558 (deeming as "correct[ ]" the holding in Watson) (dicta).
262. For cases almost uniformly rejecting this theory in other contexts, see Hirsch, supra note
51, at 178 n.14, 180 n.17.
263. Thornton v. Scarborough, 348 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1965).
264. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (2012).
265. For a case construing the language "entitled to acquire" as crucial to resolving that a
bequest made to the debtor under the will of a testator who died during the 180-day window, but
where the will was not probated until after the 180-day period had expired, still flowed back into
the bankruptcy estate, see Chenoweth, 132 B.R. at 164, aff'd 143 B.R. at 533, aff'd 3 F.3d at 1113
(observing that '[a] different interpretation ... would gut the provision").
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by a deadline, 266 suggest a meaning that relates to timing, not to
substance. The section nowhere mentions disclaimers. 267
Congress's decision to strike the reference to vesting likewise
carried in its train no substantive implications. The term had also
appeared in several more parts of the analogous section of the former
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 setting out the scope of the bankruptcy estate,
and all usages of the word disappeared simultaneously from the modern
section 541.268 The word vest admits of multiple meanings: it could be
read to refer to property vested in interest (in contrast to a contingent
interest), or vested in possession (in contrast to a future interest), or
vested in title. 269 By eliminating the term, Congress might have aimed
to avoid ambiguity. In connection with another use of the term in the
same section, the Bankruptcy Commission Report to Congress
proposing the draft version of the modern Bankruptcy Code
recommended striking the word vested "[a]s a matter of style." 2 70 Once
again, the Report never referred to disclaimers. 271 In its turn, the
legislative history fails to explain the removal of the word vested and
never suggests that changes in the language of section 541(a)(5) were
intended to affect disclaimers. On the contrary, the legislative history
indicates that section 541(a)(5) "continues over [from the former
Bankruptcy Act] the inclusion in property of the estate of certain
property acquired by the debtor within six months [of the petition], but
expands the categories of covered property to include life insurance
benefits and divorce or alimony settlements." 2 7 2 Notably absent from
this statement is any mention of disclaimed inheritances as part of the
"expand[ed]" coverage of section 541(a)(5). 273
266. See supra text accompanying note 257.
267. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5).
268. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976) (repealed 1978) (first three
paragraphs), with 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
269. The last of these choices appears the likeliest candidate for the intended meaning of the
word "vested." An earlier part of this section of the former Bankruptcy Act refers to the trustee as
'vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a) (1976) (repealed 1978) (first paragraph); see also id. § 70(a)(7) (referring to "contingent
remainders . . . which, within six months thereafter, become assignable interests," not "become
vested interests," thereby suggesting that when the term was used, it was not intended to draw
this distinction); Thornton v. Scarborough, 348 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1965) ("We conclude that the
word 'vests' used here [in the Bankruptcy Act] is not a word of art used in determining what kind
of property interest the bankrupt acquired upon the death of his father. We think the words 'vests
in' are synonymous with 'is acquired by' or 'passes to.' ").
270. COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 149 (1973).

271. See id. at 147-52; see also id., pt. I, at 192-95.
272. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at

176 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. 5963, 6136 (emphasis added).
273. See id.
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In other respects, courts have failed to construe section 541(a)(5)
as strengthening the trustee's powers to reach property unavailable to
the trustee prior to the petition. The corpus of a testamentary
spendthrift trust, for example, remains outside the bankruptcy estate,
whether the trust came into existence prior to the petition or within 180
days thereafter. 274 To distinguish the treatment of disclaimers of
property in this regard would create an anomaly within the general
framework of section 541(a)(5).
Putting aside the text of the Bankruptcy Code and considering
public policy in the ideal, how should we come down on the matter at
hand? The first point to make here is that, although we might find cause
to distinguish the treatment of disclaimers executed by a beneficiary
who never enters bankruptcy from those executed by one who does, we
have no reason to distinguish disclaimers by a beneficiary who enters
bankruptcy on the basis of when they were executed. If bankruptcy
policy dictates that federal law should apply to insolvent disclaimers
(the main issue, which we have yet to entertain), then that policy is
equally pertinent to all disclaimers assessed in a bankruptcy
proceeding, including those executed before the petition for relief. If
insolvent beneficiaries can affect the outcome by strategically timing
their petitions, then they have an opportunity to thwart bankruptcy
policy. What is more, strategic manipulation in itself can appear
inconsistent with the equities of bankruptcy relief.
It was these concerns that prompted enactment of the 180-day
window in the first place. Prior to 1938, a strict line of cleavage
separated the treatment of pre- and postpetition inheritances. Any
inheritance that matured after the bankruptcy petition was covered by
the discharge, immune to the claims of prepetition creditors. As a
result, insolvent beneficiaries could improve their position by
competing in a "race with death."2 7 5 They sprinted to the courthouse to
file their petitions even while their loved ones were breathing their last,
sometimes winning-or losing-that race by a matter of days, hours, or,
in one reported instance, 75 minutes. 276
Lawmakers and commentators criticized this behavior both as
undermining bankruptcy policy and as an expression of bad faith. 2 77 In
274. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 541(c)(1),

(c)(2) (2012); Mann v. Kreiss (In re Kreiss), 72 B.R. 933, 935-

36, 940-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
275. William F. Adler, Some Effects of the Chandler Act on Other Branches of the Law, 15 U.
CIN. L. REV. 429, 430 (1941).
276. In re McKenna, 137 F. 611, 611 (N.D.N.Y. 1905). For more such cases, see Hirsch, supra
note 51, at 177 n.8.
277. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 74TH CONG., ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 226 n.4
(Comm. Print 1936) (describing accelerated petitions by inheriting debtors as "an abuse" and
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response, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1938 to capture
postpetition inheritances. 2 7 8 Yet, the emerging rule distinguishing
disclaimers of inheritances that arrive pre- and postpetition is today
restoring just such an opportunity for manipulative timing. Now,
however, the strategy operates in reverse: after becoming hopelessly
insolvent, beneficiaries must stave off bankruptcy until after the death
of their benefactor. If the death occurs before bankruptcy, beneficiaries
can take advantage of state rules of disclaimer that cease to operate if
the death follows bankruptcy. Of course, creditors can force debtors into
bankruptcy sooner than they would like by bringing an involuntary
petition. 2 79 In theory, at least, manipulative timing is a game that two
can play. But in practice, few creditors possess the knowledge necessary
to manipulate the date of a petition relative to an anticipated
inheritance, about which they are likely to remain ignorant.
Evidence of manipulative timing is already beginning to emerge
in the published cases. 280 In at least four instances since the turn of this
century, petitions for bankruptcy relief have followed within days of
disclaimers by the petitioning debtors. 281 Although arguably less
shameful than the old "race with death,"282 artful postponement of
petitions until after the coast is clear appears equally objectionable for
the same reasons. 283 Yet bankruptcy law is ultimately to blame for
creating the opportunity. Were lawmakers to reinterpret or revise the
Bankruptcy Code to apply a single, consistent rule to insolvent
disclaimer irrespective of when one occurs, procrastination by debtors
would become pointless. To accomplish this result, lawmakers need to
'virtually a fraud upon the [Bankruptcy] Act" which "should be discouraged"); Woodson v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 619 (9th Cir. 1988) (indicating that the
180-day window served to "[prevent] debtors from manipulating the bankruptcy date so as to
deprive creditors of certain assets"); Bank of Elberton v. Swift, 268 F. 305, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1920)
(condemning accelerated petitions as "an attempt to violate [the Bankruptcy Act's] spirit and to
use the process of the court to perpetrate a fraud"); Louis D. Gage, Jr., Note, 1947 WIS. L. REV.
398, 399 (describing the 180-day window as thwarting debtors who were "acting in bad faith" to
"use the bankruptcy act as a means of evading payment of debts"). For a further discussion, see
Hirsch, supra note 51, at 223-35.
278. This change, along with a number of other bankruptcy reforms, was ushered in by the
Chandler Act of 1938. See Hirsch, supra note 51, at 177 nn.10-11.
279. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
280. One court anticipated the strategy. See Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 610 F.2d
512, 517 n.15 (8th Cir. 1979).
281. Simpson v. Penner (In re Simpson), 36 F.3d 450, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) (petition followed
one day after disclaimer); Cassel v. Kolb, 267 B.R. 861, 863 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd sub nom. In re
Kolb, 326 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003) (petition followed three days after disclaimer); Faulk v.
Bank of Okla. (In re Faulk), 281 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002) (petition followed one day
after disclaimer); In re Kloubec, 247 B.R. 246, 250 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (same).
282. See supra note 275.
283. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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coordinate sections 548 and 541(a)(5) so that they operate seamlessly,
observing either state law or a federal rule of insolvent disclaimer. If
federal lawmakers choose to bar insolvent disclaimers, then the twoyear reachback of section 548284 would leave creditors ample time either
to discover a disclaimer and bring an involuntary petition or simply to
threaten one in the ordinary course of enforcing their claims. Debtors
who saw the handwriting on the wall would have no reason to persist
in seeking to delay bankruptcy.
The question remains: Should the rules of insolvent disclaimer
(whenever executed) change in a federal bankruptcy proceeding and,
assuming so, what should those rules become?
In exploring this problem, we begin with the general proposition
that rights of debtors and creditors at state law should extend into
bankruptcy. This principle has crystallized into an interpretive
presumption for provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 85 It follows from
the understanding that either creditors' individual remedies at state
law or their collective remedies in bankruptcy may prove more efficient
in any given case; accordingly, lawmakers seek to encourage parties to
choose bankruptcy only when it will minimize the total cost of winding
up a particular debtor's affairs. Parties have that incentive if the value
of their rights in or out of bankruptcy remains unaltered. But if the
values of those rights change in bankruptcy, parties gain an incentive
either to enter, or to avoid entering, bankruptcy in order to take
advantage of rule disparities, even if the costs of legal process rise as a
consequence. 286
Nevertheless, this principle has limits. Courts are careful to add
that, if sufficient reason exists, entitlements in bankruptcy can deviate
from those created by state law, even though bankruptcy will thereby
become a greener doctrinal pasture either for the debtor or for creditors
(or for particular classes of creditors, competing inter se). "[T]here is no
reason why ... interests should be analyzed differently simply because
an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding," the U.S.
Supreme Court has opined, "[u]nless some federal interest requires a
different result."2 87 That interest must be something concrete, the Court
continued, not just "undefined considerations of equity."2 88
Do any federal interests appear in connection with the law of
insolvent disclaimers in bankruptcy? Here, the entitlements of federal
284. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
285. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 764 (1992); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,

55 (1979).
286. For a discussion, see JACKSON, supra note 227, at 21-27, 57-67.
287. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added).
288. Id. at 56.
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creditors are not at stake-we have already dealt with those
entitlements. 2 89 Conceivably, the distinctive remedial apparatus of
bankruptcy might suggest the utility of a federal rule of disclaimers as
concomitant to that apparatus. Alternatively, lawmakers might
perceive a federal interest in law reform, grounded either in some
structural infirmity of decentralized rules of insolvent disclaimer or in
some specific, concrete failure of state rules of disclaimer to do justice.
Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn, in search of a viable
candidate for federal intervention.
So far as the distinctive remedy of bankruptcy is concerned, it is
not enough to say, as one court has, that the "philosophical premises"
of bankruptcy make an insolvent disclaimer's "admitted effect of
thwarting creditors .

..

completely contrary to the spirit and philosophy

of the Bankruptcy Code." 2 90 Bankruptcy's raison d'itre is not to enhance
creditors' rights; in fact, the U.S. Supreme Court prefers to construe the
Bankruptcy Code "to minimize[ ] the possibility" that creditors will use
its provisions "to gain access to otherwise inaccessible funds" at state
law. 291
At the same time, the discharge in bankruptcy creates a
substantial asymmetry between state and federal law, advancing the
interests of debtors by granting them a "fresh start." 2 92 Lawmakers
could judge a debtor's opportunity to disclaim inheritances as
inconsistent with the policy underlying the discharge. Were they to
draw that conclusion, federal lawmakers would have reason to "bundle"
a rule avoiding insolvent disclaimers together with the rule of
discharge. 293 Debtors selecting between the remedies available in
bankruptcy and at state law could choose either to take both rules
together or to make do with neither. 294
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we have to consider what
function the discharge serves. Economic theory holds that the discharge
operates to mitigate the social costs of insolvency. Without a fresh start,
289. See supra Part III.A
290. Agristor Leasing v. Dinsdale (In re Dinsdale), No. L-92-00669C, 1993 WL 1112064, at *8
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 1993) (denying a discharge to a disclaiming debtor, rather than
avoiding the debtor's disclaimer).
291. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 764 (1992).

292. 11 U.S.C.

§ 524 (2012).

293. See supra note 38.
294. Alternatively, debtors' insolvent disclaimers could stand, but a bankruptcy court could
deny them a discharge by virtue of their conduct. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2). On petition of trustees,
several courts have taken this approach. In re Dinsdale, 1993 WL 1112064, at *11; Nashville City
Bank & Trust Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984). But see
Laughlin v. Nouveau Body & Tan, L.L.C. (In re Laughlin), 602 F.3d 417, 430 (5th Cir. 2010)
(granting a discharge despite a prepetition disclaimer).
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debtors who become hopelessly insolvent would lose their incentive to
produce, preferring instead to consume leisure and state-supplied
welfare benefits (which are exempt from levy), knowing that creditors
would seize funds a debtor earned to satisfy their claims. That harms
both debtors' families and society at large. 2 95 The public interest in
avoiding that injury justifies the discharge of debts in bankruptcy.
On first glance, debtors who might wish to exercise a right of
insolvent disclaimer appear in less need of a discharge. If their
inheritances are large enough to lift them out of insolvency, debtors will
regain their incentive to seek gainful employment. By avoiding
insolvent disclaimers in bankruptcy, lawmakers could ostensibly
minimize the number of cases where a discharge becomes necessary.
But this analysis ignores the ex ante implications of such a rule;
lawmakers must bear in mind that everything is tentative where
expectancies are concerned. If a benefactor realizes that an insolvent
beneficiary will have no right to disclaim in bankruptcy, then ordinarily
the benefactor will revoke whatever bequest he or she had planned to
make to that beneficiary. 296 The upshot is that the debtor will still need
a fresh start to become productive. At the same time, if lawmakers
allowed an insolvent beneficiary to disclaim in bankruptcy, prompting
the benefactor to leave a bequest unchanged, and if the beneficiary
thereafter exercised a right of disclaimer, then he or she would again
need a fresh start. In other words, a debtor's need for a discharge
proves, on reflection, to be independent of the rules of insolvent
disclaimer. On that basis, lawmakers can reasonably decouple those
rules from access to the discharge. Those few courts that have spoken
to this issue of policy have drawn the same conclusion. 297
Considered in structural terms, resort to state rules of
disclaimer in bankruptcy could comprise an affirmative virtue. By
drawing on an already developed body of rules, federal lawmakers could
potentially spare themselves the effort of crafting rules on their own

295. For references to judicial and scholarly discussions, and to instances noted in the case
law where insolvent debtors have quit their jobs, see Hirsch, supra note 51, at 206-10.
296. See supra text accompanying note 53. This assumption depends, obviously, on knowledge
and vigilance, which is not always present. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16. But a rule
barring insolvent disclaimer creates an incentive for benefactors to check on their beneficiaries'
financial health and to update their estate plans diligently.
297. See In re Laughlin, 602 F.3d at 426 n.9 (concluding without analysis that no "generic
'federal interests' in bankruptcy or discharge preclude deference to state property law here");
Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 610 F.2d 512, 519-20 (8th Cir. 1979) (observing that
where a disclaiming debtor "is in any case himself kept from benefiting[,' no "fraud upon the act
[i.e., upon the grant of discharge]" occurs, and noting further that if a disclaimer is collusive, then
it is void under state law and hence also in bankruptcy (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis in original)).
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and, in the bargain, clarify this area of federal law more rapidly. 298 In
bankruptcy, as in connection with tax liens, the efficiency of interstitial
lawmaking with respect to the general rules of disclaimer is clear. 2 99
But as concerns the key issue of insolvent disclaimer, one single element
of the law of disclaimers, the benefits of free riding become insignificant.
As of now, in fact, many states lack a clear rule of insolvent
disclaimer. 300 It is entirely possible that federal lawmakers could clarify
this pocket of law more rapidly by making rules on their own than by
borrowing them 30 1-although that outcome remains uncertain and
hardly qualifies as a compelling justification for federalizing the law of
insolvent disclaimers in bankruptcy.
Still another consideration is that rules developed at the state
level might betray some structural infirmity that federal bankruptcy
law ought to be concerned about. State rules in this segment of
disclaimer law-as in many others-vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. It could happen that the respective rules in effect in the
state of the benefactor, the beneficiary, and the several creditors could
differ from one another. But this fact causes no conflicts problem in
connection with disclaimer law. As we have already observed, the
universal conflicts rule is that the law of the domicile of the benefactor
at the time of his or her death governs disclaimers of property
distributed out of the benefactor's probate estate. 302 Accordingly, no
choice-of-law issue can arise if lawmakers import state laws of
disclaimer into bankruptcy proceedings.
Another danger is that special interest groups might seek to
capture local laws of insolvent disclaimer. 303 Although better-organized
creditors could have that opportunity, evidence fails to indicate that
they have exerted influence over these laws: insolvent disclaimer
remains possible in a majority of states where the rule is clear. 304 As a
matter of political vdritd, this fact might suggest that creditors care
little about these rules-perhaps because they do not rely on prospects
of inheritance when they extend credit to debtors. 305

298. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
299. See suprap. 1882.
300. Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 60, at 155.
301. See Milens v. Bostian, 139 F.2d 282, 284 (8th Cir. 1943) (finding the validity of a
disclaimer in bankruptcy to be unclear because the issue was governed by state law and the state
law of insolvent disclaimer was unsettled). See also supra text accompanying notes 13, 30-32.
302. See supra note 174.
303. See supra notes 15-16, 22, and accompanying text.
304. See Hirsch, supra note 44, at 592-601; Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 60, at 154-55.
305. See supra note 45.
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In the absence of lobbying by creditors, state lawmakers might
be tempted to make their jurisdictions friendly to debtors as a means of
attracting debtors' assets to their states. 306 That has happened before:
it is no coincidence that Delaware was one of the first states to give
effect to self-settled spendthrift trusts, 307 and Delawareans have been
remarkably frank about their ambitions to transform their state into a
trust haven. 308 Nor is Delaware the first state to veer down such a path.
Long before Delaware got into the game, Rhode Island was known to
citizens of other states as "Rogue's Island." 309 But no race to the bottom
can unfold in connection with disclaimer law because debtorbeneficiaries do not control the choice of law. The applicable law
depends on the domicile of the benefactor, and the benefactor does not
need to rely on disclaimer law to protect his or her assets. If he or she
knows that an insolvent beneficiary will be unable to disclaim a
bequest, then the benefactor can disinherit the beneficiary altogether.
That leaves the possibility of using bankruptcy law simply to
exercise quality control over state law, which may lack the technical
virtuosity of federal law. 310 Such an exercise should not be, and is not,
a customary practice in a system where lawmakers wish to maintain a
rough parity of entitlements between state and federal law so that
parties have an incentive to enter bankruptcy only because it is the
more efficient means of winding up a debtor's affairs. 311 But in some
other areas of bankruptcy law, where federal lawmakers have found
state entitlements so ill-considered as fairly to cry out for reform,
lawmakers have gone ahead and modified them. 312 Federal bankruptcy
law respects state entitlements only so long as they are "reasonable," in
306. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
307. See Hirsch, supra note 17, at 2685 n. 1.
308. The legislative history of Delaware's self-settled spendthrift trust statute submits that
the rationale for this item of legislation was "to maintain Delaware's role as the most favored
domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts." H.B. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del.
1997) (synopsis).
309. The sobriquet derived from the state's "unorthodox views toward government, which held
that government existed to facilitate (by fraudulent means if necessary) the business activities of
its citizens." FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE

CONSTITUTION 175 (1985). And six jurisdictions today-Delaware not among them-have
established themselves as homestead havens, with an unlimited homestead deduction. Robert J.
Landry, III, An Empirical Analysis of the Causes of Consumer Bankruptcy: Will Bankruptcy
Reform Really Change Anything?, 3 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 2, 6 n.41 (2006).
310. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 285-86.
312. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012) (invalidating, in bankruptcy, unrecorded liens that
are effective at state law). This provision, known appropriately as the strong arm clause, "is
motivated by an antipathy towards secret liens." TABB, supra note 227, § 6.3, at 472. See also 11
U.S.C. § 548(e) (extending to ten years the reachback period for challenging self-settled spendthrift
trusts as fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy).
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the words of one court. 313 The same is true of other areas of federal law
that import state rules into their interstices. 314
Do state rules of insolvent disclaimer offend the standards of
reasonability? For the most part, they do not. The varying rules appear
responsive neither to local socioeconomic needs nor to local cultural
values. 315 What the rules do reflect is a good-faith effort to make sound
policy where the better approach is unclear and remains a point of
academic debate. 316
But in one instance, with regard to one discrete problem, a state
rule of insolvent disclaimer has become unreasonable. Dangerously, the
rule in question is embedded within the uniform acts, where-like a
defective gene-it can spread unthinkingly to a growing number of
states.
The problem arises in connection with disclaimers of joint
interests. The traditional rule found in every non-uniform jurisdiction,
as well as in all previous iterations of the Uniform Probate Code, and
in the federal tax code, is that when a joint tenant dies, the survivor can
disclaim his or her accretive share of the joint interest. 31 7 This rule
make obvious sense: the accretive share is what the survivor gains, that
is, the part of the joint tenancy in which the survivor now holds a
proprietary interest, which he or she did not hold prior to the decedent
joint tenant's death. "Disclaimer only applies to property which passes
upon death to the disclaimant, not to property owned by the disclaimant
prior to the death." 318
As revised in 2002, however, the Uniform Probate Code adopts
a rule all its own for disclaimers of joint interests. Under this rule, in a
two-party joint interest the survivor can disclaim either the accretive
share or one half of the joint interest, whichever is greater.319 Thus,

313. Glosbandv. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 21 B.R. 963, 971 (D. Mass. 1981).
314. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (observing, in connection
with the incorporation of state law definitions into the text of the federal Copyright Act, "This does
not mean that a State would be entitled to use the word 'children' in a way entirely strange to
those familiar with its ordinary usage").
315. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
316. See generally Hirsch, supra note 44. The issue was much debated by the Uniform Law
Commissioners when they most recently revised their treatment of disclaimers within the uniform
acts. See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 60, at 158-61 (citing to the plenary discussions of the
Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act of 1999).
317. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 854.13( 2 )(b) (20 1 4 ); In re Estate of Kirk, 591 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa
1999). The tax code makes one exception, noted hereinafter. See infra note 321 and accompanying
text.
318. Kirk, 591 N.W.2d at 635.
319. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1107(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1, U.L.A. 398 (2013). This rule
was first promulgated under the freestanding Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act of
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under the Uniform Probate Code, a surviving joint tenant is not limited
to disclaiming his or her accretive share-the survivor can potentially
disclaim property that he or she owned already. 320 As the legislative
history makes clear, the commissioners added this wrinkle in order to
take account of a tax opportunity open only to surviving joint tenants of
real property who happen also to be noncitizen spouses, carving out an
exception from the usual tax rule that a surviving joint tenant can make
a qualified disclaimer limited to his or her accretive share. 321 For
simplicity's sake, the drafters decided to turn what could have appeared
as a special exception into a general rule, 32 2 not realizing that another
section of the Uniform Probate Code functioned to make the intended
exception, 323 and also without considering the section's implications for
the rights of debtors and creditors. 32 4
From the perspective of debtor-creditor law, the rule creates an
undesirable planning opportunity. 325 An insolvent debtor residing in
any state can conspire with a terminally ill person who is domiciled in
a state where the Uniform Probate Code rule operates, and who can
receive a fee for his or her services, to effect what is functionally a
fraudulent transfer. The two begin by opening a joint bank account. The
terminally ill person deposits nothing into it, while the insolvent debtor
deposits all of his or her remaining liquidated wealth. 326 The terminally
1999, which was grafted in its entirety into the Uniform Probate Code in 2002. UNIF. DISCLAIMER
OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 7(a) (amended 2010), 8A U.L.A. 174 (2003).
320. When the joint interest is held by more than two persons, the distortion becomes even
greater under the formula set out in the Uniform Probate Code. In this respect, the Uniform
Probate Code's formula resulted from an eleventh-hour amendment that had stemmed from an
interpretive error made during the plenary debates over the provision and initiated from the floor
rather than by the drafters. For a discussion of this aspect of the provision and its legislative
history, see Hirsch, supranote 206, at 38.
321. For the tax rule and a discussion of the legislative history and policy underlying this
provision of the Uniform Probate Code, see Hirsch, supra note 43, at 339-41.
322. See id. at 341 (quoting the Reporter's defense of the provision).
323. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1114, 8 pt. 1, U.L.A 409 (giving substantive effect to any
disclaimer that is "qualified" under the federal tax code). For a further discussion, see Hirsch,
supra note 43, at 340-41. Possibly the drafters' failure to perceive the redundancy of the jointinterest provision stemmed from the fact that it was formulated before section 2-1114 was added
to the draft. See id. The legislative history contains no evidence that the drafters ever doubled
back to assess the interconnection between the two sections. Sometimes, the order in which rules
materialize matters!
324. Those rights were never mentioned, let alone examined, anywhere in the legislative
history. See Hirsch, supranote 43, at 341-42.
325. For a fuller discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, The Uniform Acts'Loophole in Fraudulent
Conveyance Law, EST. PLAN., Dec. 2007, at 20.
326. The debtor's deposit to the bank account should not qualify as a transfer because the
depositor continues to hold a proprietary interest in the deposited funds. See Crawford v. Crawford
(In re Crawford), 172 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("[T]he term 'transfer' . . . is intended
to cover any transaction whereby a transferror [sic] divested himself or herself . . . [ofJ
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ill person executes a will leaving his or her interest in the joint account
(which is zero 32 7) to beneficiaries selected by the insolvent debtor. When
the terminally ill person dies soon thereafter, the insolvent debtor can
disclaim half of the joint account as a surviving joint tenant, even

though he or she had a proprietaryinterest in all of those funds prior to
the death of the decedent joint tenant. Although the gimmick itself is
collusive, the disclaimer is not. 32 8 And under the Uniform Probate Code
a disclaimer is never a "transfer."32 9 Creditors cannot undo the
disclaimer, even though they could otherwise avoid any transfer of the
debtor's own funds as a simple case of constructive fraud. 330
That the drafters allowed such a glitch to creep into the Uniform
Probate Code is not so surprising. Legal expertise tends to be narrow;
when uniform trusts-and-estates acts have ramifications that spill over
into other fields, such as creditors' rights, the risk of error rises. 331

property. . . ."); Bascom/Magnotta, Inc. v. Magnotta, No. X04CV044034706S, 2008 WL 283264, at
*12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2008) (noting but not addressing the proposition that "there was no
transfer, fraudulent or otherwise, . . . because the ownership interest is retained in the owner of
an account"); Brodzinski v. Pulek, 174 A.2d 907, 912 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1961) (observing
that "the creation of the joint tenancy was not a 'conveyance' within the purview of [fraudulent
conveyance law]"). By comparison, where a debtor deposits individual funds into an entireties
account, which creditors cannot reach under state law, a court can hold the deposit fraudulent.
Corbett v. Hunter, 436 A.2d 1036, 1037-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
327. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
329. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105(f) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 391 (2013).
330. See UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT (amended 2014) §5(a), 7Apt. 2 U.L.A 129 (2006)
(originally UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (1984) § 5(a)).
331. Less pardonable has been the studied indifference of the Joint Editorial Board for
Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts, which is charged with monitoring these products and with
recommending revisions as the need arises-or becomes apparent expost facto. The Joint Editorial
Board has acknowledged the glitch (brought to light in a previous publication, see Hirsch, supra
note 325) but has declined to correct it, concluding-on a wing and a prayer-that the likelihood
of its exploitation, although "possible," is "extremely remote." Memorandum from Thomas Gallanis
to the Joint Editorial Bd. for Unif. Trusts and Estate Acts 4 (Mar. 31, 2007) (on file with author)
(minutes of the Joint Editorial Board spring meeting, 2007). On this basis, the Joint Editorial
Board concluded that "the topic should be kept on file for consideration when, at a future time, the
Act is ready for a comprehensive revision." Id. This decision comes despite the fact that the
provision furthers no public policy. See Hirsch, supra note 43, at 340-42, 344-45. But again, the
Joint Editorial Board's position may simply reflect a poor understanding of debtor-creditor lawas if the scope of activities that comprise fraudulent transfers should depend upon the probability
that such activities will occur! Nor is the Board's optimism about debtors' propensities to exploit
the glitch warranted: history shows that debtors often go to heroic lengths to avoid satisfying
creditors' claims. See, e.g., SEC v. Solow, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315-18, 1327-35 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(ordering the incarceration for civil contempt of a debtor who deposited assets into a foreign trust
and self-created conditions making repatriation of those assets impossible). By comparison,
commentators anticipate that some taxpayers will exploit an opportunity (which Congress had
sought imperfectly to thwart) to avoid gratuitous transfer taxes under new portability rules by
serially marrying terminally ill individuals, which commentators have dubbed the "black-widow"
strategy. See, e.g., Paul A. Silver, Minimizing the Costs of the Client's Testamentary Goals:
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Surely, though, a state rule (currently found in eleven jurisdictionS332)
that upends over four-hundred years of fraudulent transfer law
qualifies as "[un]reasonable." 333 So long as federal courts override the
Uniform Probate Code's reconceptualization of state-law rights in
jointly held property upon disclaimer, creditors will have the
wherewithal to defeat the gimmick by bringing involuntary petitions
against debtors and then by challenging prepetition disclaimers as
federally defined fraudulent transfers within the forum of a bankruptcy
proceeding. This issue has yet to arise, however, and it remains
unresolved even by lower bankruptcy courts.
In fact, under the circumstances, federal lawmakers might
consider going further: Congress could enact legislation to override this
provision of the Uniform Probate Code both in and out of bankruptcy. 334
The difference is largely cosmetic because creditors would be able to
avoid these disclaimers in any event by bringing debtors who execute
them into bankruptcy involuntarily. 335 And this less intrusive
alternative might better suit the sensitivities of local lawmakers, who
might resent a direct incursion upon "the legitimate and traditional
interest which the State has in creating and defining the property
interest of its citizens." 336 Under these conditions, indirect preemption
by dint of a forum selection opportunity holds some appeal. 337
IncorporatingFlexibility and Savings into Your Estate Planning Strategies, in BEST PRACTICES
FOR STRUCTURING TRUSTS AND ESTATES 7, 10 (2014). Should we expect debtors to have greater
qualms about (merely) establishing joint bank accounts with terminally ill persons? Over a third
of the states that enacted the revised Uniform Probate Code sections on disclaimers have
prudently modified the flawed provision to eliminate the glitch. See infra note 332 and
accompanying text. The risk remains that insolvent debtors anywhere can still exploit the glitch
by locating a willing collaborator in one of the remaining eleven states that has adopted the flawed
provision without modification, because the rules of disclaimer that apply are those of the domicile
of the decedent joint interest holder. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
332. These are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia. Six other jurisdictions that have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code's provisions on disclaimers have corrected the glitch by substituting either
formulas or language that confine surviving joint tenants to disclaiming their accretive shares:
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota. See Hirsch, supra note 43, at 327,
344-45.
333. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. Modern fraudulent conveyances law took
shape as early as 1571, with the passage of the British Fraudulent Conveyances Act of 13
Elizabeth. 1571, 13 Eliz., c. 5 (Eng.).
334. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 971-76
(1981) (arguing that Congress should take this approach to issues of law reform that do not relate
exclusively to bankruptcy proceedings). Such legislation would almost certainly pass
constitutional muster; Congress already regulates other aspects of debtor-creditor law. E.g., Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692a-o (2012).
335. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
336. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 514 (1960).
337. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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VI. CONCLUSION

All told, the federal law of disclaimers remains unsettled. In only
one of the four spheres that we have reviewed has the U.S. Supreme
Court undertaken to clarify congressional silence or ambiguity on the
matter. And even in that instance-where the Court weighed the
effectiveness of a disclaimer against a federal tax lien in Drye-the
Court's opinion is poorly structured, leaving matters that the Justices
sought to resolve unresolved.338 Upon inspection, as we have observed,
there is less to that opinion than meets the eye. 339
Grant Gilmore once described "the preponderant role played by
the states as architects of our private law" as giving way to "[t]he federal
giant . . . just beginning to stir: with his long-delayed entrance, we are,
it may be," Gilmore speculated, "at last catching sight of the principal
character." 340 At least within the arena of trusts and estates, that giant
has slumbered for a long time, and he has yet to throw his weight
around in a big way, so to speak. Within the still narrower arena of
disclaimers, he is also just starting to make his presence felt, and he
has not picked the occasion to put his foot down. Federal law can play
a constructive role in the realm of disclaimers, although the problems
presented are not monolithic, as this Article has endeavored to show. In
fact, a reflective giant zeroing in on disclaimers will need to put his foot
down not once, but three times.
Where a direct federal interest is involved, federal lawmakers
have reason to protect that interest. They cannot count on state
lawmakers to do so on their behalf, except where institutions have been
structured to make federal and state interests coincide. By comparison,
where federal regulation over a particular species of property is
involved, federal lawmakers need to integrate disclaimer law into that
regulatory scheme so far as necessity requires. Finally, where a federal
proceeding covers all kinds of property, federal lawmakers can take the
opportunity to compensate for the failings of state law, offering an
improved version of the rules of disclaimer made available to parties
within the federal forum. The calculus underlying each of these
exercises in lawmaking is distinct and demands no synchronized
response; federal lawmakers must take care not to confuse one problem
with another.
The federal laws of disclaimer is not an oxymoron.

338. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
340. Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1046 (1961).

